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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have focused attention on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC") revision process of late, 1 and have reached 
divergent conclusions regarding the efficacy of the status quo2 as 
well as the prospects for real improvement in the future.3 In past 
articles we identified some deficiencies in the process4 and have 
offered specific suggestions for improvement.5 That debate, and 
our contribution to it, will not be repeated here. 
The focus of this inquiry, instead, is on the method of the draft-
ers of the revision of article 2, what they have chosen to do, and 
what they have neglected to do. These may not merely be prob-
1 See, e.g., Peter A Akes & David Frisch, On the U.C.C. Revision Process: A Reply to Dean 
Scott, 37 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1217, 1218 (1996) (responding to Dean Scott's criticism of 
UCC law revision process); Corrine Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the lWiores or 
"'110 Is Saving the U.C.C. ?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564-66 (1993) (noting influence of spe-
cial interest group representatives in commercial law reform process); Kathleen Patchel, 
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Unifurm Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Unifurm 
Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 155-62 (1993) (advocating revision of uniform law 
process in order to curb special interest politics); Donald]. Rapson, "'110 is Looking Out/or the 
Public Interest? Thoughts About the U.C.C. Revision Process in Light (and Shadows) of Professor 
Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 250-55 (1994) (evaluating criticism of UCC 
revision process); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobb-yist: Some Notes 
on the Process of Revising U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 759-73 (1993) (criti-
cizing commercial law drafting and reasoning process); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 600-04 (1995) (analyzing 
American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and their function as private law-making groups); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Artic/,e 9, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1783, 1803-06 (1994) (discussing commercial law revision process of UCC article 
9); Harry C. Sigman, Improving the U.C.C. Revision Process: Two Specific Proposals, 28 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 325, 326-32 (1994) (proposing "public comment" period following approval of re-
vised article). 
2 Compare Alces & Frisch, supra note l, at 1218 (noting trend "toward greater balance 
in the commercial law than has ever before been realized"), with Scott, supra note 1, at 1786-
88 (recognizing that although secured creditors have been enthusiastic about article 9, 
debate as to whether legal regulation of secured financing fosters efficiency is inconclusive), 
and Patchel, supra note l, at 85-86 (noting increased concern that articles 3 and 4 of UCC 
inadequately protect consumer interests). 
' See Alces & Frisch, supra note 1, at 1245-46 (discussing problems with amending 
article 9's filing system); Scott, supra note 1, at 1816-22 (commenting on risks associated with 
special interest group involvement in revision of article 9); Patchel, supra note 1, at 155-62 
(suggesting ways in which UCC redrafting process can be altered to create structure more 
favorable to groups that have been inadequately represented in creation of existing law). 
4 See Peter A Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on "Purpose" in the Unifurm Commercial 
Code, 58 Omo ST. LJ. 419, 447-52 (1997) (describing deficiencies, including deference 
accorded to uniform law reporter, in formulation of official comments to UCC). 
5 See id. at 452 (suggesting that careful, systematic perusal of both black letter and 
official commentary prior to introduction of uniform law into state legislature establishes 
independent review on uniform law reporter's official comments). 
20 University of California, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
lems of process; they may be more profound. But we choose to 
approach them as problems of process and suggest how adjustment 
of the drafters' method might produce a commercial law more 
considerate of fundamental commercial contracting principles 
and, therefore, more responsive to the needs of the commercial 
community. 
Our conclusions and recommendations are the product of our 
appreciation that, first, any revision of an article of the UCC must 
appreciate commercial law context - the relationship among the 
complementary common law and statutory regimes, the fit with 
evolving commercial law principle, and the other articles of the 
UCC; second, the revision of article 2 is proceeding as a 
negotiation between parties with conflicting understandings of the 
tensions between commercial actors in ways that did not determine 
the promulgation of original article 2 (at least not to the same 
extent); third, empirical research has not generally provided a 
foundation for an adjustment to the status quo. 
Part I of this Article endeavors to put the sales law in perspective 
by emphasizing its role in the broader system of commercial law. 
Then, in Part II we focus on a particular example (the buyer's right 
to recover goods upon the seller's insolvency) to support our gen-
eral observation that the revision reflects a fatal insensitivity to the 
need for article 2 to fit with other bodies of commercial codifica-
tion. Part III demonstrates the revi~ion's failure to come to terms 
with the role of context and makes the argument that the drafters' 
shortsightedness is evidenced by the manner in which the drafters 
treat the symbiotic relationship between warranty and products 
liability law. In Part IV we make the case for care in data collection 
as a predicate to drafting. Finally, we conclude that the article 2 
revision project may not, as currently realized, be worth the com-
mercial law candle. 
I. THE UCC AS PART OF A COMMERCIAL LAW SYSTEM 
A central aim of Karl Llewellyn and his fellow drafters of the 
UCC ("Code") was to provide judges with an institutionalized pro-
cess of interpretation that emphasized the Code's purposes and 
policies, and the underlying objectives of individual sections. 6 This 
6 See Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretati<m of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some 
Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1978) (discussing Llewellyn's 
approach to codification and its origins in American legal realism). The natural starting 
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purposive approach to statutory interpretation is based on the idea 
that cases of statutory ambiguity are frequent, and that the resolu-
tion of the ambiguity calls for an inquiry into something other than 
the plain language of the text. Because of statutory ambiguity, out-
comes must tum on the purpose behind the statute; there is simply 
no other way to decide hard cases. The point goes deeper still. 
Whether there is ambiguity is a function not simply of text, but of 
text as it interacts with purpose. Cases are easy only when the un-
derlying purposes are not in dispute. There are no easy cases 
without a clearly defined purpose, which is necessary to give con-
text, and hence meaning, to language. Llewellyn put it this way: 
The rationale of this is that construction and application are 
intellectually impossible except with reference to some reason 
and theory of purpose and organization. Borderline, doubtful, 
or uncontemplated cases are inevitable. Reasonably uniform in-
terpretation by judges of different schooling, learning and skill is 
tremendously furthered if the reason which guides application 
of the same language is the same reason in all cases. A patent 
reason, moreover, tremendously decreases the leeway open to 
the skillful advocate for persuasive distortion or misapplication 
of the language; it requires that any contention, to be success-
fully persuasive, must make some kind of sense in terms of the 
point for understanding the structure and philosophy of the Code is the jurisprudential 
theories of Karl Llewellyn as discussed in Eugene Mooney's article: 
Although much of the actual drafting of the various articles was done by 
committees, Llewellyn was the coordinator and, as such, exercised both 
tremendous influence and practical control over the whole project. He 
and Professor Corbin served on the committee drafting the sales article 
and in great measure Llewellyn wrote that section of the Code to suit him-
self. The first version was published in 1949 and although there have been 
numerous and extensive revisions since then, the sales article and the all-
important introductory article (article 1) retain most of the characteristics 
built into them by Llewellyn. 
Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principl.es and Karl's New Kade: An Essay on the jurisprudence of 
Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 223 (1966). Llewellyn was one of the most 
influential figures in the realist assault on the conceptualism of the old order. See generally 
WILLIAM Tw!NING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (providing inter-
pretation of Llewellyn's thought and development). 
Central to the realist movement was a belief in the necessity for a "purposive interpre-
tation" oflegal institutions. The theory of purposive interpretation is rooted in the concept 
of law as a means to selected social ends - a method of social engineering. It seeks to de-
fine legal standards in terms of the purposes they are designed to implement. It denies that 
either statutory provisions or common law doctrines can be adequately understood by refer-
ence to a standard of ordinary or plain usage. See id. 
22 University of Califarnia, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
reason; it provides a real stimulus toward, though not an assur-
ance of, corrective growth rather than straitjacketing of the Code 
by way of caselaw. 7 
Most conceptions of purposive interpretation emphasize a neces-
sary balance between the Code's purposes and policies, which are 
designed to promote the Code as a whole, and the purposes and 
policies of the individual sections under consideration.8 To re-
quire a judge to give due deference to the purposes and policies of 
the Code as a whole does not necessitate that the judge ignore the 
rationale of the particular sections that will actually decide the 
case. To the contrary, the underlying reasons, purposes, and poli-
cies of each section take a prominent place in a judge's interpreta-
tive enterprise.9 This balance is reflected in the Code itself. 
7 Karl Llewellyn, Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers, J, VI, I, e at 5 (1944) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file at University of Chicago Law School), quoted in TwlNING, supra 
note 6, at 322. 
8 See, e.g., DONALD B. KING, THE NEW CONCEPTUAUSM OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 12 (1968) (stating that policy considerations should also apply on individualized basis 
rather than being limited only to broad underlying purposes of Code); Steve H. Nickles, 
Rethinking Some U. C. C. Article 9 Problems - Subrogation; Equitable Liens; Actual Knowledge; 
Waiver of Security Interests; Secured Party Liability fur Conv=ion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REv. 1, 7 
(1980) (noting that purposes and policies underlying section 1-102 "are designed to pro-
mote the Code as a 'code', i.e., a particular form of statutory law") (citation omitted). When 
interpreting the Code, due emphasis should also be placed on the purposes and policies 
underlying the particular rules and principles of Code sections potentially relevant to the 
decision of a case. See id. 
9 This application of purpose and policy is not always easy. See generally Akes & Frisch, 
supra note 4 (noting there are several potential sources of purpose and one can be skeptical 
about ability of each to articulate and express underlying objectives of particular Code sec-
tions). For example, we have argued that even the UCC comments cannot necessarily be 
relied upon to provide accurate insight into drafters' beliefs about the objectives of the 
various provisions of the Act. See id. at 447-52; see also infra notes 14-16 and accompanying 
text (discussing practical problems one encounters when relying on purpose as interpretive 
methodology). 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in a purposive approach to language and 
meaning, we believe that adherence to this approach yields systematic benefits that do not 
necessarily follow from other theories of statutory interpretation. Among these benefits is 
uniformity of construction. In this regard, consider the introductory comment to the Code, 
which provides in pertinent part that 
[u)niformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main objec-
tives of this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without substan-
tial uniformity of construction. To aid in uniform construction of this 
Comment and those which follow the text of each section set forth the 
purpose of various provisions of this Act to promote uniformity, to aid in 
viewing the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against miscon-
struction. 
General Comment of National Conference of Commissioner3 on Unifurm State Laws and the American 
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The importance of Code purposes and policies in textual inter-
pretation is the subject of the very first section following the official 
title of the Code. Section 1-102 states: 
( 1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage and agreement of 
the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions.10 
The influence (if any) of section 1-102 in textual interpre~tion 
is not a settled issue, however. n Perhaps the most fundamental 
criticism of the application of these values is that they do not always 
lead to uniform results because courts often disagree over which 
policy is paramount. 12 We do not attempt to order these policies, 
although we recognize that in particular cases their comparative 
importance could be crucial in making substantive decisions. For 
example, section 1-102 creates a potential for tension between sub-
stantive choices that promote uniform results and those that per-
mit a court to achieve a more perfect outcome by a liberal con-
Law Institute to U.C.C. 1 U.L.A. at xv (2d ed. 1989). 
10 U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-(2) (1998); see alw Alces & Frisch, supra note 4, at 421-25 (giving 
historical overnew of these subsections). 
11 See Alces & Frisch, supra note 4, at 428-29 (noting that one could take view that even 
thou~h Code policies were drawn upon, court was guided primarily by other concerns). 
1 Also, frequently there will be arguments about how the policies should be applied. 
As one commentator has recognized: 
[S]tating that the Code is to be interpreted to further objectives does not 
in itself provide a precise standard for the determination of the outcome 
of a particular controversy. Otherwise stated, the mandate to interpret the 
Code so as to further its objectives does not furnish any real guide to con-
struction because the purposes are of "an essentially neutral nature" and 
"a great deal will depend upon the vantage point of the one contemplating 
the problem. · 
RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 1-102:41, at 51 (3d ed. 1981). None-
theless, we believe that the objectives are at least useful in beginning the discussion about 
substantive decisions. 
24 University of Califamia, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
struction of statutory language.1s Notwithstanding the fact that the 
objectives articulated in section 1-102 tend toward vacuity and self-
contradiction, the message is clear: the Code should be construed 
on a policy basis rather than on the basis of mechanical application 
of ordinary rules of language. 
Given the difficulties with section 1-102, it is not surprising that 
the drafters reasoned that purposive interpretation demands the 
judge adopt a posture of deference to . the policy of a particular 
section.14 Presumably, the drafters considered policy issues such as 
simplification, clarification, modernization, expansion, and uni-
formity when drafting each section and formed their intentions 
regarding its meaning.15 Furthermore, the deferential judicial pos-
ture demanded by purposive interpretation requires that the draft-
ers provide the judge with a guide to uncovering the reason(s) for 
the decisions that were made. In sum, the drafters must abide by 
" Compare In re Broward Auto Brokers, Inc., 11 U .C.C. Rep. Serv. 402, 404 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1972) (stating that if particular courts or jurisdictions waive one or more specific re-
quirements of UCC in order to liberally construe act, complete lack of uniformity would 
probably result) with AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(providing that liberal construction of section 2-609 should dispense with need for written 
demand for adequate assurance of performance). See generally McDonnell, supra note 6, at 
852. McDonnell states: 
Id. 
A court faced with the problem of the financing statement as a security 
agreement today would have to contend with the policy of simplification in 
section 1-102(2) (a), which supports the recognition of a financing state-
ment as security agreement, and the policy of uniformity in section 1-
102(2) (c), which, in light of the case law, supports the contrary result. 
Moreover, how is the jurist to assess which alternative will modernize the 
law governing commercial transactions in accordance with section 1-
102(2) (a)? 
14 See KING, supra note 8, at 8 (discussing use of policy considerations by courts). King 
states: 
Policy considerations are not to be limited only to the broad underlying 
purposes and goals of the Code, but are also to be considered on a more 
individualized basis. When a court is confronted with an interpretation of 
a given Code provision or section, it should look to the underlying pur-
pose and policy of that particular section in order to give it meaning. The 
drafters were clear in their intentions on this point. 
Id. at 12. 
15 See, e.g., In re Wolfe, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 177, 180 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1971) (applying 
literal reading to Code language in section 9-103); In 111 Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 766, 
772-73 (Bankr. D. Me. 1966) (suggesting literal reading furthers Code policies); White v. 
Hancock Bank, 477 So. 2d 265, 273 (Miss. 1985) (indicating need to faithfully apply and 
enforce Code). 
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"[t]he principle of the patent reason: Every provision should show 
its reason on its face. Every body of provisions should display on 
their face their organizing principle."16 
An example of judicial deference to the practical authority of 
purpose is provided by the Official Comment to section 1-102, in 
which the drafters cite with approval a case in which the court "dis-
regarded a statutory limitation of remedy where reason of the limi-
tation did not apply."17 In Fitennan v. J N. Johnson & Co.,18 the 
court permitted a buyer to rescind a contract for breach of war-
ranty despite the buyer's inability to return to the seller all of the 
goods that were delivered. 19 The drafters made clear that "nothing 
in this act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by 
m . 
the courts." Thus, we have found that courts continue to use pol-
icy to supersede the plain language of a particular Code section. 
Such is the interpretative force of the drafters' directive: "[T]he 
text of each section should be read in light of the purpose or policy 
of the rule in question."21 And such is the nature of purposive in-
terpretation as perceived by Llewellyn. 
Before applying Llewellyn's directive to some of the decisions 
made by the Article 2 Drafting Committee, it is necessary to note 
·that the Code exemplifies a general model of legislative drafting 
that is far different from that of an ordinary statute.22 The Code 
16 Karl Llewellyn, Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers, J, VI, I, e at 5 (1944), quoted in 
Tw!NING, supra note 6, at 321-22 (discussing Llewellyn's thoughts on Code construction, that 
intei;vretation should be based on reason behind language of Code). 
1 U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995) (citation omitted). 
18 194 N.W. 399, 400-1 (Minn. 1923). 
19 See id. at 401 (discussing return of inferior automobile tire casings as "specially manu-
factured goods" unable to be resold). 
20 U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1. 
•1 Id. 
22 See William D. Hawkland, Unifurm Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 
291, 292 (discussing difference between code and statute). Since the Code was first drafted, 
several legal scholars have suggested that it meets the requirements of a "true code" in the 
continental sense of codification. For example, William D. Hawkland reaches this conclu-
sion based on the following perceived difference between a "code" and a "statute": 
A "code" is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a 
whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its 
subject area save only that which the code excepts. It is systematic in that 
all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent 
terminology, form an interlocking; integrated body, revealing its own plan 
and containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is suf-
ficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in ac-
cordance with its own basic policies. 
26 University of California, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
follows what has been described as a systems approach to lawmak-
ing.2s However, we should not simply assume that the Code is a 
self-contained system. Before we amend the Code we need to ap-
preciate the connection between the substantive provisions of the 
Code and law external to the Code, as well as relevant commercial 
practices. The whole point is that the Code is only part of a much 
larger system. This is fast becoming conventional wisdom. For 
example, Professors Lynn M. Lopucki and Elizabeth Warren ob-
serve that: 
Law is one of many elements that together constitute the secured 
credit system. To teach the law without teaching the system in 
which it is embedded would deprive the law of much of its mean-
ing and make it more difficult to unders.tand. But to teach the 
whole system requires discussion of institutions, people, and 
things that are not "law." Among them are sheriffs, bankruptcy 
... A mere statute, on the other hand, is neither preemptive, systematic, 
nor comprehensive, and, therefore, its methodology is different from that 
of a code. 
Id.; see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 28 (1969) (suggesting that 
UCC differs from other codes in comparative law); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROSS. 330 (1951) (describing UCC as 
general code, limited only by content). Notwithstanding the obvious similarity between the 
UCC and a true code, "the underlying ideology - the conception of what a code is and of 
the functions it should perform in the legal process - is not the same. There is an entirely 
different ideology of codification at work in the civil law world." MERRYMAN, supra, at 28. 
Whatever its nature, it is clear to us that the Code is a very special type of legislative producL 
" Professor Edwin W. Patterson, who was sensitive to the structural aspects of the Code, 
made this point when commenting on the Code for the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion. See 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REvlSION COMM'N REPORT; STUDY OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 65 (1980) [hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N REPORT). What he meant by a 
"system" was: 
A body of interrelated propositions about a common subject matter which 
are consistent with, and thus aid in the interpretation of each other. The 
characteristics of "system" are orderly arrangement in expression and the 
maintenance of consistent relations of super- and sub-ordination in con-
tent. By the latter is meant, not the deduction, demonstrable by a syllo-
gism, of a subordinate rule from a "higher" principle; this is not the way 
that higher principles of law are ordinarily used. Three things, especially, 
seem to count for legal system: 1. That all exceptions to a specific code 
rule be stated with the rule or referred to in it by cross-reference to an-
other provision. 2. That the code shall have enough "safety-valve" concepts 
or principles, or what one writer on comparative law has called "super-
eminent" provisions to serve as justifications for modifying the harsh re-
sults of specific rules. 3. That the implied or underlying policies of the 
various provisions should be compatible with each other. 
Id. at 6."r66. 
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trustees, filing systems, security agreements, financing statements, 
search companies, Vehicle Identification Numbers, closing prac-
tices, collateral repurchase agreements, and a variety of other 
commercial and legal practices. Together.with law from a variety 
of sources, these things constitute the system we know as secured 
credit .... 24 
27 
This model has consequences for judge and drafter alike. If any 
truly rational approach to decision making under the Code re-
quires consideration of the balance of all relevant policies, then 
the approach must weigh heavily the intrinsic value of maintaining 
the statute as a system of interdependent premises and conclu-
sions. 25 This approach to Code interpi::etation furthers one of the 
declared goals of the original drafters: to develop "an integrated, 
comprehensive treatment of a single body of law, in which at least 
to a large extent particular rules represent merely the application 
in varying contexts of the same essential principles."26 To ensui;:e 
adequate protection of this value, today's Code drafters must vi~~ 
their task (at least in part) as making sure that the topics dealt with 
in the Code fit together in a logical way. This requires not o~y 
that the sections in each article be compatible, but, additionalfy, 
that there be a systematic tying together of the several articles. 
Moreover, when we tum to drafting, our ability to recommend par-
ticular decisions will depend upon our insight into the location of 
the doctrine in question within the entire commercial world order. 
Having formulated Llewellyn's conceptual view of statutory in-
terpretation and the systematic nature of the Code, we tum oilr 
attention to the most recent draft of the article 2 revision. We ar-
gue, and will demonstrate, that several of the decisions made by 
the Drafting Committee are inexplicable in terms of policy and fail 
to accommodate essential principles expressed elsewhere in the 
Code and, in some cases, in the law outside of the Code. From this 
perspective we suggest that the process by which the Code is cur-
24 Kathryn R Heidt, Taking a New Look at Secured Transactions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 
765-66 (1996) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A 
SYsTEMSAPPROACH (1995)). 
25 Perhaps the most important benefit to be gained from codification of any subject 
area is that "it can be used to introduce order and system into the mass oflegal concepts and 
ideas and so present the Jaw as a homogeneous, related whole rather than as a series of 
isolated propositions." Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, A Primer on Codification, 29 TUL. L. REv. 
303, 307 (1955). 
26 1 N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note_ 23, at 18. 
28 University of Califamia, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
rently drafted and revised does not provide the best possible re-
sults. We demonstrate the incongruities of the revision's current 
approach by focusing first on the provision of the buyer's right to 
recover goods upon the seller's insolvency. 
II. SPECIFIC EXAMPLE: UCC SECTION 2-502 
Existing subsection ( 1) of section 2-502 formulates the right of a 
buyer to recover goods on a seller's insolvency. It reads: 
Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not 
been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of 
goods in which he has a special property under the provisions of 
the immediately preceding section may on making and keeping 
good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover them 
from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days af-
ter receipt of the first installment on their price.27 
This is a theoretical remedy, not a practical one. Upon reading 
the section, it is immediately noticeable that the remedy granted is 
destined to ever elude the grasp of most buyers who may wish to 
use it. To begin with, the buyer must have a "special property" in 
the goods under section 2-501.28 In other words, the goods must be 
identified to the contract. Although this requirement poses no 
real problems for many buyers, it may make the section unavailable 
to a large portion of buyers who contract for specially manufac-
tured goods.29 Furthermore, there is the near impossible task of 
having to prove that the seller was solvent when it received the first 
installment and became insolvent ten days thereafter.30 
27 u.c.c. § 2-502(1) (1998). 
28 See id.§ 2-501 (1) (1998). 
29 See JAMES]. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 220 (4th ed. 
1995) (suggesting that identification of specially manufactured goods to contract does not 
occur until their completion); see also 3A RICHARD W. DUESENBERG & LAWRENCE P. KING, 
BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE U.C.C. § 
9.05[3], at 9-50 to 9-51 (1998) (discussing effect on buyer when specially manufactured 
goods are destroyed before identification takes place). But see Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 636 P.2d 
839, 842 (Mont. 1981) (holding that identification occurs at time of first step in produc-
tion). Unfortunately, section 2-502(1) is silent on when the buyer's special property must 
vest. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, at 220 (assuming that goods must be identified within or 
prior to ten-day period after insolvency). But see ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 484 
(1970) (suggesting that UCC drafters likely intended that buyer must have special property 
at time buyer tendered balance of purchase price). 
'° See First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 179 S.E.2d 850, 854 
1998) Commercial Codification. 29 
The reality is that section 2-502, in its present incarnation, only 
pays lip service to the protective needs of the prepaying or financ-
ing buyer. This shortcoming led the Article 2 Study Group to rec-
ommend the section be repealed.31 The Drafting Committee, how-
ever, has taken the opposite approach. Rather than scrap the sec-
tion because of its restrictive limitations, the Committee has de-
cided to strengthen the section by scrapping some of the limita-
tions. Gone from the section is any mention of the seller's insol-
vency.32 To be sure, this change will not solve all the possible prob-
lems; among other things, the buyer must still acquire a special 
property in the goods at the appropriate time. Still, it will provide 
the buyer with a remedy that is far more vigorous than the one 
presently available under section 2-502. 
A. Policy Analysis 
The most striking aspect of the current version of section 2-502 is 
its limited scope. The linchpin on which the remedy rests is the 
seller's insolvency within ten days after receipt of the first install-
ment on the purchase price. There is a correlative provision in 
section 2-702 which allows sellers to reclaim goods sold on credit to 
an insolvent purchaser.33 Taken together, these provisions are ap-
parently premised on the notion that dealings by those who are 
insolvent, or at the brink of insolvency, are per se fraudulent with-
out any further requirement that there be some form of active 
concealment or express misrepresentation.34 Both sections 2-502 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that section 2-502 was inapplicable when seller was insolvent 
at time of initial payment). 
'
1 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY 
GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT 132 (Rec. A2.5(2)) 
(1990). 
" See U.C.C. § 2-824 reporter's note 1 (Discussion Draft Jan. 24, 1997). 
" This section reads, in pertinent part: 
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit 
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten 
days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made 
to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the 
ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection 
the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent 
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay. 
U.C.C. § 2-702 (1998). 
"' See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-702 cmt. 2 (stating that "[s]ubsection (2) takes as its base line the 
proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit 
30 University of California, Davis [Vol. 32:17 
and 2-702(2) can, therefore, be explained as special remedies for 
tortious conduct. However, once the insolvency provision in sec-
tion 2-502 is deleted, as proposed by the Drafting Committee, what 
justification is there for affording the buyer a right of specific re-
covery?55 
Section 2-502 may still be justified under the theory that it pro-
vides a more realistic and certain recovery for the buyer who can 
show actual reliance on the contract. This conclusion is easily sup-
ported if section 2-502 allows buyers to recover based on any type 
of reliance. However, section 2-502 does not allow recovery based 
on any reliance, rather 2-502 requires reliance in the form of pre-
payment. This requirement leads to the odd result that a buyer 
who relies substantially, but does not prepay, will not recover under 
2-502, but a buyer whose reliance is in the form of prepayment, no 
business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the particular 
seller"); 1 N.Y. LAW COMM'N REPORT, supra note 23, at 467 (stating that "[i]t might be sug-
gested in support of section 2-502 that if seller receives an advance cash payment immedi-
ately before he becomes insolvent, the possibility that fraud was perpetrated on buyer justi-
fies a general statutory rule affording buyer specific reparation"). 
35 See U.C.C. § 2-824 reporter's note 2 (Discussion Draft Jan. 24, 1997) (providing that 
prepaying buyer's remedy was broadened because such buyers, "especially consumer buyers, 
should have some protection under Article 2"). Quite clearly this is not an answer to the 
central question. Interestingly, revised article 9 amends section 2-502 as follows: 
BUYER'S RIGHT TO GOODS ON SELLER'S REPUDIATION, FAILURE 
TO DELIVER OR INSOLVENCY. 
(I) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and even though the goods have 
not been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of 
goods in which he has a special property under the provisions of the 
immediately preceding section may on making and keeping good a 
tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover then from the 
seller if: 
(a) in the case of goods bought for personal, family, or household pur-
poses, the seller repudiates or fails to deliver as required by the con-
tract; or 
(b) in other cases, the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt 
of the first installment on their price. 
(2) The buyer's right to recover the goods under subsection (I) (a) vests 
upon acquisition of a special property, even if the seller had not then 
repudiated or failed to deliver, 
(3) If the identification creating his special property has been made by 
the buyer he acquires the right to recover the goods only if they con-
form to the contract for sale. 
U.C.C. § 2-502 (Discussion Draft Mar. 1, 1998) (visited Nov. 10, 1998) <http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc9/ml4draft.htm> (on file with author). This change to section 
2-502 was made as part of a more general compromise with consumer advocates. Of course, 
if the Article 2 Drafting Committee does not decide to change the current scope of its pro-
posed 2-502, then all buyers would receive the benefits of this new remedial right. 
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matter how small the payment, may recover under section 2-502. 
Consider a simplified example involving two buyers (Bl and B2). 
Each buyer contracts with Seller to purchase a machine for 
$100,000. In both cases identification of the machine occurs when 
the contract is made. Bl makes an advance payment of $10 on the 
purchase price. B2 makes no prepayment on the purchase price. 
What are the respective rights of Bl and B2 under section 2-502 if 
Seller repudiates the contract or otherwise fails to deliver either 
machine? Presumably Bl has a right of specific recovery and B2 
does not. In terms of their reliance on the contract is there any 
real difference between the two buyers? The answer must be no . 
. Suppose, however, that B2 relies on the contract in other, more 
substantial ways. For example, assume that B2 modifies its physical 
plant to accommodate the machine. Would that change the result 
under section 2-502? Again, the answer is no.56 
From the foregoing example, it is fair to assume that the princi-
ple motivation of the drafters in revising section 2-502 is generally 
· not to protect the reliance interest. However, this point, standing 
alone, does not show that they did not have the more narrow pur-
pose of protecting a particular form of reliance - namely, pay-
ments made on the contract price. Perhaps one can explain the 
revision by the fact that a prepaying buyer stands to suffer in a way 
sufficiently distinct from all other buyers so as to warrant a differ-
ent remedy. Even accepting the validity of such a premise (which 
we do not), the potential operation of section 2-502 makes us ques-
tion whether this can be the actual policy rationale. In order to 
understand our skepticism, it is necessary to consider a second ex-
ample. 
Assume the same facts as in the first example, except· that B2 
contracts with Seller to purchase the machine previously purchased 
by Bl and makes a prepayment of $75,000. What would be the 
result? If the purpose of new section 2-502 is perceived to be the 
'" It still may be that 82 will be able to recover the machine under section 2-716, which 
defines the circumstances in which both specific performance and replevin are available. 
The Code reserves specific performance for those cases "where the goods are unique or in 
other proper circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1998). Replevin, the second remedy in 
section 2-716 is conferred "if after reasonable effort [the buyer] is unable to effect cover for 
such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if 
the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in 
them has been made or tendered." U.C.C. § 2-716(3). Ifwe assume a vast and easily acces-
sible market for similar machines, we doubt that even the most liberal-minded judge could 
find in the text of section 2-716 a reason why 82 should be given a proprietary power over 
the machine. 
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protection of a particular form of reliance (i.e., prepayment), it 
would not be strictly faithful to that goal if B2 would be deprived of 
its ability to claim the machine. Yet, we believe the Code would 
dictate a result in favor of Bl. 
In article 2, the general conveyancing principle appears in sec-
tion 2-403 (I): "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his 
transfer or had or had power to transfer . . . . "37 So in the absence 
of a statutory or common law exception, article 2 follows the deri-
vation principle of nemo dat 38 and provides that B2 takes the ma-
chine subject to the property interest created by the possessory 
remedy afforded Bl under section 2-502.39 Unless a court would be 
willing to characterize the seller's interest as "voidable title," there 
is no exception in the Code, or otherwise, to the general rule in 
section 2-403(1).40 
In sum, we are unable to discern a coherent policy rationale for 
37 u.c.c. § 2-403(1) (1998). 
38 The complete Latin maxim is nemo dat quod non habet (one cannot give what one does 
not have). See John F. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Inter-
ests, 59 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811-20 (1979) (discussing three conveyance principles: shelter 
principle, good faith purchase, and Twyne Rule); Steven L. Harris, The Interaction of Article 6 
and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priarities, and Code Interpretation, 
39 V AND. L. REv. 179, 194-201 ( 1986) (discussing conveyancing principles that underlie 
Code); see, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ. 
1057, 1057-1107 (1954) (discussing development of good faith purchase doctrine). Nemo dat 
dictates that the transferee takes its interest subject to all third-party claims and interests that 
were enforceable against the transferor. This principle is not confined to article 2. See gener-
ally U.C.C. §§ 3-305(a), 3-306, 7-504, 8-302, 9-318 (1998). 
'
9 This statement is based on the assumption that property interests are defined by the 
availability of a remedy that permits a person to exercise dominion over the specific asset or 
to exclude the exercise of dominion by others. See also 1 N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 
23, at 578 (stating "[i]t is not easy to grasp the substance behind a notion that buyer has 
'property' in goods when he does not have power to compel their delivery, or risk of loss, 
and has at most the opportunity to insure his expectation of receiving then goods"). See 
generally David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different Perspective on Specific Performance Clauses, 
35 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1691, 1695-1717 (1994) (discussing relationship between legal 
remedies and protected property interests). If Bl were denied the use of section 2-502 and 
all similar possessory remedies such as specific performance, the result would be differenL 
She would have no existing property interest in the machine that would continue following 
its sale to 82. 
40 The second sentence of section 2-403(1) provides that "[a] person with voidable title 
has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." U.C.C. § 2-403(1). 
Although the term "voidable title" is undefined, the examples given by the drafters in the 
text of section 2-403 suggest that it is a concept reserved for buyers. See id. § 2-403(1) (a)-(d). 
The only other statutory exception to nemo dat that might conceivably be relevant is the 
entrustrnent rule of section 2-403(2), which reads as follows: "[a]ny entrusting of possession 
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights 
of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." Id. § 2-403(2). Has there been 
an entrusting? Unless Bl can be said to have acquiesced in seller's retention of possession, 
the answer is no. 
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the drafters' decision to delete the requirement of the seller's in-
solvency from section 2-502.41 If the purpose were to protect the 
reliance interest, then why is the remedy only available to those 
buyers who prepay? If, on the other hand, the goal was to afford a 
special remedy to those buyers who happen to rely in a specific · 
way, then why should the relative degree of reliance not matter? 
B. Systemic Concerns - Within the Code 
Questions about relationships, in addition to that of buyer and 
seller, complicate the normative analysis of any proposed change 
to article 2. Before we can say that the decision to revise section 2-
502 is justified, one must consider how the new section will mesh. 
with the many concepts and provisions that form the interlocking 
Code system of commercial law. Unfortunately, the focus of the 
Article 2 Drafting Committee has primarily been on issues pertain-
ing to the effects of its decisions on sales law. As this part of the 
. Article will demonstrate, sales policies also raise questions about 
the rights of third parties, including questions about how to bal-
ance article 9 security interests with the Code's cutoff of those in-
terests in favor of certain buyers of the collateral.42 
Buyer in the ordinary course of business concerns provide the 
41 In a very real sense, a buyer who prepays is buying a limited form of specific perform-
ance. The section 2-502 remedy is a less complete remedy only because it requires goods 
that have been identified to the contract, whereas specific performance under section 2-716 
is not so limited. Ironically, once sellers learn that they are, in essence, agreeing to specific 
performance every time they accept a prepayment, we may expect to see an increase in the 
price that prepaying buyers are asked to pay. The "law and economics" scholarship tells us 
that if specific performance is available to the buyer, she, rather than the seller, will enjoy 
whatever surplus is made possible by the appearance of a second buyer who values the goods 
more than does the first buyer. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note .29, at 218: 
If, on the other hand, Buyer One has a right to specific performance, he 
has the power to enjoy the surplus by getting the goods and, himself, re-
selling them to Buyer Two. Of course, this does not necessarily cause an 
efficiency gain, but causes a wealth transfer or allocation from the original 
seller in a damage regime to aggrieved buyers in a specific performance 
regime. 
Id. Presumably, sellers will wish to be compensated for giving up the expected value of the 
gain that could be earned if they were permitted to transfer performance freely in order to 
consummate the efficient breach. See id. at 218-19. 
42 Article 9 secured parties would not be the only third p~es affected by the proposed 
change to section 2-502; they are just one example. For instance, the textual discussion will 
apply with equal force if the third party is an "owner" who has entrusted goods with a mer-
chant having the power under section 2-403(2) to transfer the owner's interest in the goods 
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
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clearest path into our article 9 analysis. To illustrate the most basic 
aspect of the problem, let us suppose that Seller borrows money 
from Bank and grants Bank a security interest in its then existing 
and after-acquired inventory of boats. Some time later, Buyer con-
tracts with Seller to purchase one of the boats. For whatever rea-
son, Buyer makes the decision to pay part or all of the purchase 
price without taking delivery of the boat. If the boat is still in 
Seller's possession when Bank acquires the right and makes the 
decision to proceed against its collateral, will Bank still have a secu-
rity interest in the boat that was sold to Buyer?43 
In considering this case, the court will look to the good faith 
purchase doctrine in section 9-307, which provides: "[A] buyer in 
the ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security interest 
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected 
and even though the buyer knows of its existence."44 In our hypo-
thetical the court will have to struggle with the Code's definition of 
"buyer in ordinary course of business."45 Buyer will argue that the 
" This hypothetical was inspired by the case of Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 
404 A.2d 842, 843-45 (R.I. 1979) (indicating that individual may become buyer at time of 
identification rather than time of delivery). Irrespective of whether the security interest 
continues in the boat, the secured party will have a security interest in the cash proceeds, 
provided that they remain identifiable. See U.C.C. § 9-306 (1)-(3) (1998) . 
.. u.c.c. § 9-307(1) (1998). 
45 The text of section 1-201 (9) provides the following definition of buyer in ordinary 
course: 
(A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him 
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party 
in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of sell-
ing goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All persons 
who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead or mine-
head shall be deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods of that 
kind. "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on se-
cured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of 
title under a preexisting contract for sale but does not include a transfer 
in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
U.C.C. § 1-201 (9) (1998). What the definition does not tell us is when during the progres-
sion of a sales transaction the purchaser will qualify as a protected buyer. See David Frisch, 
Buyer Status Under the U.C.C.: A Suggested Tempura[ Definition, 72 IOWA L. REV. 531, 534-40 
(1987) (concluding that buyer status occurs when buyer obtains remedial right to goods 
with regard to seller). It should be noted that the proposed revised draft of article 9 con-
tains a revised definition of buyer in the ordinary course. The revision resolves a previous 
ambiguity by specifying that only a buyer that takes possession, or one that has a right to the 
goods under article 2, may be a buyer in the ordinary course of business: 
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person that buys goods in 
good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another 
person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than 
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court should invoke the policies underlying the good faith pur-
chase doctrine, thus giving Buyer the protection of section 9-
307 ( l). 46 On the other hand, Bank will argue that the sales trans-
action had not yet progressed to the point at which buyer status 
arises.47 Faced with an ambiguous statute and the absence of clear 
guidance from case law on the issue of when buyer status is 
achieved, the resultingjurisprudence remains, at best, ad hoc.48 
The lack of clarity in this area of the law is the result of many 
courts' willingness to use the good faith purchase doctrine to pro-
tect the buyer, even where the buyer has no possessory remedy 
against the immediate seller. Simply put, if the seller has not yet 
delivered the goods and the buyer does not have the legally cogni-
zable power to wrest the goods from the seller's possession, the 
buyer should not be able to take advantage of a doctrine that is 
premised on the implicit assumption that the buyer has a title ex-
pectation needing protection. Future delivery is speculative be-
cause the seller may cease doing business or decide to direct the 
goods elsewhere. The good faith purchase doctrine was never in-
tended to cleanse the seller's title to speculative goods. So long as 
a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys 
goods in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the 
usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is 
engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices. A person 
that sells oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead is a per-
son in the business of selling goods of that kind. A buyer in ordinary 
course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on 
secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title 
under a pre-existing contract for sale. Only a buyer that takes possession 
of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under 
Seetion 2 [XXX] Article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. 
A person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in 
total or partial satisfaction of a money debt is not a buyer in ordinary 
course of business. 
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (Discussion Draft Mar. 1, 1998) (visited Nov. 10, 1998) <http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc9/m14draft.htm> (on file with author). 
46 See U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The good faith purchase doctrine, which is embodied in this 
section, seeks to facilitate market trading by reducing title uncertainty. See id. See grmerally 
Gilmore, supra note 38 (describing good faith purchase doctrine in commercial context). 
47 Bank may argue that buyer status cannot be achieved until Buyer obtains possession 
of the boat. Although authority for such a position is scant, it does exist. See, e.g., Hale M. 
Smith, Tit/,e and Right to Possessicm Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. 
CODE 39, 64 (1968) (arguing that buyer must obtain possession of goods). 
48 See Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 487 A.2d 953, 957 
(Pa. Super. Ct 1985) (holding that "[t]he point at which a person becomes a buyer in ordi-
nary course is subject to considerable controversy because the Code does not specify the 
moment at which the status is conferred"); Frisch, supra note 45, at 540-68 (discussing com-
monly accepted alternatives for pinpointing moment that buyer status is achieved). 
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the buyer is able to obtain a judgment for damages, he receives a 
bargain that ought to have been within his range of reasonable 
expectations.49 The buyer's title concerns crystallize once he ob-
tains the power to compel the seller's performance. It is then that 
the buyer's legitimate claim to good faith purchase treatment ma-
terializes. 50 
It should now be pointed out that section 2-502, in its proposed 
form, turns a buyer's speculative expectation into a possessory 
right. Thus, section 2-502 in conjunction with the good faith pur-
chase doctrine will, in limited circumstances, cause a creditor's 
secured interest to be stripped away in favor of a prepaying buyer 
of the collateral. Therefore, if the barriers to 2-502 are removed, as 
the Drafting Committee proposes, new policy concerns come into 
play. Quite clearly, the proposed change has the potential to shift 
the Code's balance of protection from secured parties to buyers. 
Whether this is desirable will depend on a conscious application of 
commercial law policies such as "clarity, simplicity, flexibility, fair-
ness, consistency, and completeness."51 Our argument is that the 
drafters cannot simply ignore systemic aspects of the Code. The 
49 A central assumption of article 2 is the homogeneity of goods. If the seller does not 
deliver the goods, the buyer will, most often, be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. &e 
U.C.C. § 2-713 (1998) (vindicating buyer's expectation interest by damage award based on 
market price); U.C.C. § 2-712 (1998) (vindicating buyer's expectation through actual substi-
tute ~urchase). 
See generally Frisch, supra note 39 at 1717-49 (arguing at length that existing case law is 
deeply flawed by its failure to attend to functional relationship between good faith purchase 
doctrine and Code's remedial rules). Although the argument in the text that the rights of 
the buyer should tum on the existence of a propriety power over the goods may seem to be 
of theoretical interest only, we anticipate that this view will soon find expression in the Code. 
See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 191-92 (1992). 
Permitting a putative buyer of goods to become a buyer in ordinary course 
of business from a seller before the buyer obtains possessory rights against 
the seller would produce a strikingly anomalous result: The buyer could 
take free of the rights of the seller's secured party pursuant to§ 9-307(1) 
even though the buyer would have no right to possession of the goods as 
against the seller. The seller's secured party, on the other hand, does 
have a right to possession as against the seller ... sectionl-201 (9) should 
be revised to make clear that the earliest time that a putative buyer can 
achieve buyer status under that definition is the time that the buyer 
obtains possessory rights against its seller. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
51 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private 
Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 924-25 (1995) (discussing Llewellyn's theories on constraints 
on rulemaking, and concluding that he adds "completeness" beyond the five constraints 
previously established). 
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connections between Code sections and Code articles need to be 
appreciated when considering whether to revise a provision. The 
ability to recommend changes coherently will depend on the in-
sight into the location of the provision within the entire commer-
cial law order. By embracing the Code as a system, it is possible to 
maintain it as a coherent, practically sensible whole. 
C. Systemic Concerns - Outside the Code 
Once one appreciates that the Code is part of a larger commer-
cial law system, doctrinal questions faced by the drafters take on a 
different character. They no longer pose only questions about, for 
example, the relationship between buyer and seller. They also in-
volve concrete questions about the maintenance of policies that 
underlie other statutory schemes. Bankruptcy law provides a ready 
example of the broader context in which the Code operates.52 
Equality of distribution among creditors is one of the fundamen-
tal policies of modern bankruptcy law.53 It is easy to show how re-
quiring the seller (now the "debtor") to turn over the goods pursu-
ant to section 2-502 would profoundly affect the buyer's position in 
bankruptcy and that of the seller's other creditors as well. Assume 
that prior to Seller's bankruptcy, Buyer paid $10,000 for goods to 
be delivered sometime in the future. Assume further that, at all 
rele~nt times, the goods have a market value of $11,000. Without 
the availability of section 2-502, Buyer's unsecured claim of $11,000 
would be paid in "bankruptcy dollars" and the full value of the 
goods would be available for distribution to creditors generally as 
part of the bankruptcy estate.54 With the availability of section 2-
52 Code revisions may also have consequences that are procedural in nature. Query 
whether the right to a jury trial will be lost if the buyer is seeking only to recover the goods 
under 2-502? See generally John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Ref arm and the Right to jury Trial: A 
Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 15-23 (1967) (examining 
effect of procedural changes in previous legal remedies). 
53 See Donald R Korobkin, Rehabilitating Value5: A jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. 
L. REv. 717, 735-36 (1991) (asking reader to "[c]onsider one of the most pervasive doctrines 
in bankruptcy law: the rule of equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors"). 
54 See U.C.C. § 2-711 (1) (1998) (providing that non-bankruptcy formula for measuring 
Buyer's damages is prepayment); U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (measuring Buyer's damages as differ-
ence between market price when Buyer learned of breach and contract price). In bank-
ruptcy, the reality is that the Buyer will recover, if anything, only a percentage of this total 
amounL In other words, relieving the estate from the duty of specifically complying with the 
contract increases the value of the Seller's assets. See also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Func-
tional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227, 255-57 (1989) (discussing denial of 
specific performance against trustee). 
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502, Buyer would receive the goods and Buyer's prepetition claim 
would ultimately be satisfied in full. In short, allowing Buyer to 
recover the goods during the bankruptcy proceeding would un-
dermine bankruptcy's pro rata sharing rule. 
Forcing the buyer to play by the same rules as everyone else is 
undesirable if it would prevent a distribution of assets according to 
preexisting property interests. Consider, for example, the distribu-
tional rights of secured creditors. Obviously, other creditors would 
be harmed if the allowed secured claim must be paid off at 100 
cents on the dollar. However, the preferential treatment of se-
cured creditors is not only permitted, it is mandated by the under-
lying property interest.55 Indeed, "[t]his property principle is cen-
tral to bankruptcy law because it is by far the most important ex-
ception to the principle of equality of distribution."56 The prob-
lem, of course, is determining whether an interest in a specific as-
set is property for bankruptcy purposes.57 
In evaluating whether a creditor's claim represents an interest in 
property, a bankrnptcy court should look to the relevant attributes 
of the claim outside of bankruptcy. The United States Supreme 
Court took this approach in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,58 
where the Court explained: 
In the absence of a controlling federal rule, we generally assume that 
Congress has "left the determination of property rights in the assets of 
a bankrupt's estate to state law," since such "[p]roperty interests are 
created and defined by state law." Moreover, we have specifically rec-
ognized that "[t]he justifications for application of state law are not 
limited to ownership interests .... "59 
55 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601--02 (1935) (stating 
that Fifth Amendment prohibits taking of property of mortgagees to relieve burdens of 
mortgagors); see, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON 
BANKRUPTCY 428 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "(t]he provisions of sections 361, 362, and 1129 
ensure that the secured creditors retain 'the benefit of their bargain' as envisioned by Con-
gress"). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause prohibits any at-
tempt, statutory or otherwise, to reduce involuntarily the amount of a secured creditor's lien 
for any reason other than payment on the debt 
56 Westbrook, supra note 54, at 257. 
57 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994) (listing property interest comprising estate). 
58 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (holding section 1322(b) (2) forbids debtor from relying on 
section 506(a) to reduce under second mortgage to fair market value). 
59 Id. at 329 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)) (citations 
omitted). 
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The existence of a property interest depends upon the availability 
of a remedy that permits the interest holder to exercise dominion 
over the specific asset or to exclude the exercise of dominion by 
others.60 Such is the nature of section 2-502. It would seem to fol-
low, therefore, that the property interest created by section 2-502 
may be enforced in the seller's bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, there are grounds to hesitate. A second aspect of 
the recognition of property interests in bankruptcy lies in the ap-
plication of the trustee's avoidance powers.61 Even a property in-
terest enforceable in the abstract may become invalid and unen-
forceable in various circumstances. It is to these limitations that we 
now turn. In doing so, it is helpful to distinguish between cases in 
which the goods are received by the buyer prior to the time the 
seller files a bankruptcy petition and those cases where they are 
not. 
1. Where the Buyer Has Received the Goods 
If the seller delivers the goods within ninety days prior to the 
time that seller's bankruptcy petition is filed, the trustee's avoid-
ance power under section 547 is the most likely to create problems 
for the prepaying buyer. Section 547 allows the trustee to avoid a 
prepetition preferential transfer.62 Under the current version of 
60 See Frisch, supra note 39, at 1691-1717 (arguing that nature of remedies available best 
determines whether "property right" exists). 
61 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-549 (1994) (giving avoidance power and setting limits). 
62 See id. § 54 7 (b). This section reads as follows: 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may 
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor inproperty -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before 
such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the 
filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such 
transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
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section 2-502, the buyer faces the prospect of having to return the 
goods received during the preference period or to disgorge their 
value, while the trustee gets to keep the full amount of the pay-
ments made. The theory is that the prepayment on the price was 
the antecedent debt on account of which the later transfer took 
place. The crucial point is this: the transfer must necessarily occur 
after the debt is incurred. If the buyer cannot meet the require-
ments of section 2-502 (because of the ten-clay requirement the 
section will be unavailable to most buyers) then the transfer is 
complete when the goods are delivered. Alternatively, if the buyer 
does qualify under section 2-502 before delivery, then the transfer 
would occur when the remedy vests. This takes place on insolvency 
which occurs after receipt of the price.63 Either way, the transfer is 
a preference. 
Under the new version of section 2-502, it will no longer be in-
evitable that the debt will precede the transfer. The reason is that 
the seller's insolvency will no longer matter. Once this require-
ment is dropped from the section, the conditions of section 2-502 
will be met when the downpayment is made. On this view, there 
can be no preference because there is no antecedent debt.64 
2. Where the Buyer Has Not Received the Goods 
Where the buyer has prepaid for the goods and all that remains 
is the seller's performance, it is unlikely, today, that the trustee will 
be under an obligation to deliver the goods. This result should 
change, however, once section 2-502 becomes available to the 
buyer. This conclusion embodies two assumptions: First, if the 
contract is "rejected" by the trustee it will have no effect on the 
buyer's proprietary power over the goods. Second, the trustee is 
Id. 
(C) such creditor received payment ofsu.ch debt to the extent 
provided by the provisions of this title. 
•• We are assuming that the seller's insolvency also occurred within the 90 day prefer-
ence.Period. 
If the property interest created by section 2-502 cannot be avoided in bankruptcy, it 
matters not that the goods were subsequently delivered (i.e., there is no preference). If the 
seller had not delivered the goods, the buyer could have gotten them anyway under section 
2-502. Thus, one of the elements of a preference (the creditor must be better off because of 
the transfer) would not be satisfied. Moreover, if the relevant transfer is deemed to occur 
when the section 2-502 remedy vests, one could argue that when the goods are later deliv-
ered there is no transfer, but merely a change of possession. 
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not able, by virtue of enjoying the powers of a lien creditor, to 
avoid the buyer's property interest.65 The following discussion thus 
focuses, in tum, on these two assumptions. 
If a prebankruptcy contract is deemed "executory," it can be re-
jected (subject to court approval) by the trustee.66 Rejection "con-
stitutes a breach of such contract ... (1) ... .immediately before 
the date of the filing of the petition .... "67 In assessing the fate of 
the buyer's contract, therefore, one should first decide whether the 
contract is executory. Although the term "executory contract" is 
fundamental to the application of section 365, it is nowhere de-
fined in the Bankruptcy Code.68 According to Professor Vern 
Countryman's classic definition, an executory contract is "a con-
tract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the 
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure 
of either ·to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach excusing the performance of the other."69 This inquiry pre-
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (discussing trustee as lien creditor). 
66 See id. § 365(a) (1994) (governing treatment of "unexpired leases" and "executory 
contracts"). 
67 Id. § 365(g) (providing that rejection of executory contracts is generally considered 
breach); see also id.§ 502(g) (1994) (stating that "[a] claim arising from the rejection, under 
section 365 ... shall be determined, and shall be allowed ... the same as if such claim had 
arisen before the date of the filing of the petition"). 
68 
"Executoriness" is probably the most enigmatic concept of section 365. In cases of 
contracts of modest complexity, lawyers and supposedly disinterested judges could often 
argue almost too easily for sharply conflicting, yet credible notions of when a contract is 
executory. The court in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1992), commented on this dilemma: 
After grappling with the issues presented by the parties, we believe that we 
could, using existing "executoriness" precedent, plausibly justify any num-
ber of results, from affording either party the complete relief it seeks, to 
deciding the case as we actually do. While "executoriness" analysis can 
provide a reason for any result we might reach, we find it useless as a tool 
for reaching a reasoned result. 
Id. at696. 
69 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 
( 1973) (asserting that rejection of non-executory contracts should not be treated as material 
breach). Courts that have relied on this definition include In wTerrell, 892 F.2d 469, 471-72 
(6th Cir. 1989) (determining whether land sale contract is executory under state law); In re 
Streets, 882 F.2d 233, 234-35 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that installment land contract is not 
executory); Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 
1989) (finding that natural gas utilities service agreement is executory); Draper v. Draper, 
790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (reserving judgment on whether divorce settlement is execu-
tory contract); Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 
1020, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing executory contracts in context of collective bar-
gaining agreements). 
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sumably renders the buyer's contract executory if the buyer has not 
paid in full. 
In any event, if the contract is executory, what are the conse-
quences that flow from its rejection? Traditionally, courts and 
commentators conceived of rejection as a process by which all 
property interests created by the contract are wiped out and ren-
dered unenforceable.70 That is, rejection not only triggers a pre-
petition claim for damages, but also operates as an avoiding 
power.71 In this conception of rejection, the seller is relieved from 
having to perform under section 2-502.72 Within the past several 
years a very different conception of rejection has emerged in both 
judicial and scholarly literature, one that challenges the traditional 
assumption regarding what it means to reject an executory con-
tract. 73 This emerging conception is a realization that rejection 
"does not invalidate, rejudicate, repeal, or avoid"74 the contract. As 
a result, more and more courts are concluding that section 365 is 
not an avoiding power that can be used to destroy a right in or to 
T . property created by contract. ' 
70 See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (stating that district court misunderstood law when it determined that rejection 
of executory contract could not deprive Lubrizol of all contractual rights); In re O.P.M. 
Leasing Servs., 23 B.R. 104, 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that trust can reject execu· 
tory contract lease if it will benefit estate). 
71 See Lulniz.o~ 756 F.2d at 1048 (discussing remedy available to non-bankruptcy party 
upon rejection of executory contract and other consequences of such rejection). 
72 It is this reasoning that has Jed some courts to conclude that specific performance is 
not a remedial option following rejection. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that rejection of executory contract denies 
creditors right to specific performance); In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 642 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1984) (stating that specific performance is not available remedy for rejection of executory 
contract); In re Roman Crest Fruit, Inc., 35 B.R. 939, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that 
when executory contract is rejected, specific performance cannot be ordered). 
" See In re WalnutAssocs., 145 B.R. 489, 494 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating that reject-
ing executory contract does not repeal contract); In re Seymour, 144 B.R. 524, 530 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 1992) (stating that rejection of contract is not "avoiding power"); In re Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that rejection 
does not get rid of contract); see also Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply 
to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1991) (discussing practical consequences 
of party rejecting executory contract); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REY. 845, 877-81 (1988) (discussing meaning of 
rejection as used in section 365 of Bankruptcy Code); Westbrook, supra note 54, at 282-84 
(arguing that "executoriness" requirement be abolished so no finding of executory contract 
is necessary before rejecting bankruptcy contract). 
74 In re Walnut Assocs., 145 B.R. at 494 (asserting that rejection of executory contract 
does not invalidate contract, but precludes administrative claims on debtor's estate by credi-
tors). 
75 See, e.g., id. 
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Thus, if section 2-502 is a remedial option under state law, it 
ought to survive the contract's rejection in bankruptcy. The im-
portant point, whether the contract is executory or executed, is the 
impact of the trustee's avoidance powers on section 2-502. The 
particular avoidance power that must be considered when the 
seller has yet to perform is the "strong arm" power under section 
544(a).76 
Section 544(a) provides the trustee the rights of a hypothetical 
lien creditor. 77 Under Section 544(a), the trustee has the power to 
avoid a transfer or obligation in the same manner that a hypotheti-
cal creditor would where the hypothesized creditor extends credit 
and obtains a judicial lien against the debtor at the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case.78 So the question is whether the trus-
tee, as hypothetical lien creditor, takes an interest in the debtor's 
property subject to the buyer's right to receive the goods under 
section 2-502. Article 2 contains a provision that explicitly subor-
dinates the rights of a seller's unsecured creditors (presumably 
judicial lien creditors) against goods in which the buyer has a spe-
cific proprietary interest. Section 2-402 ( 1) provides: "Except as 
provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured creditors 
of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a 
contract for sale are subject to the buyer's right to recover the 
goods under this Article (Sections 2-502 and 2-716)."79 Thus, it 
seems that the trustee, even as hypothetical lien creditor, is power-
less to retain the goods. 
Precisely for this reason, the proposed change to section 2-502 
would give the buyer an advantage over other unsecured creditors 
who have extended prepetition credit to the seller and whose 
claim_s have an equally strong moral basis. Just how differently 
situated creditors should be treated in bankruptcy is, of course, an 
enormously controversial question.80 It is just because this question 
76 We are assuming that the seller's retention of possession is not fraudulent under state 
law and that the contract price is roughly equivalent to the value of the goods. If either 
assumption turns out to be incorrect, the buyer's property interest is subject to fraudulent 
conveyance challenge in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a) (1994). 
77 See id.§ 544(a) (stating that "trustee shall have ... the rights and powers of ... (1) a 
creditor ... or (3) a bona fide purchaser ofreal property"). 
78 See id. 
79 U.C.C. § 2-402(1) (1998). 
80 See generally Bryan D. Hull, A Void in Avoidance Powers? The Bankruptcy Trustee's Inability 
to Assert Damages Claims on Behalf of Creditars Against Third Parties, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 263, 
268-78 (1991) (examining void in bankruptcy trustee's power); Thomas H. Jackson, Bank-
ruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitl.ements, and the Creditars' Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 859-60 (1982) 
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is controversial and intensely political, however, that isolated 
groups (e.g., the Article 2 Drafting Committee) should not impose 
their answers to questions of asset distribution without a dialogue 
with the broader bankruptcy community of academics and practi-
tioners. In the end, such decision making runs the risk of legislat-
ing the wrong policy choices. 
There are additional contexts that determine the efficiency of 
statutory commercial law formulations. It is to those that we now 
turn. 
Ill. THE UCC IN A COMMON LAW AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. The Compl,ementary Common Law 
The UCC is, in substantial ways, carved out of its context, the 
contract law. Section 1-103 acknowledges and posits the fit between 
each of the articles of the Code and the rest of the universe of law 
apposite to commercial transactions within the scope of the UCC.81 
There are numerous instances in which the Code, particularly arti-
cle 2, either cooperates with or conflicts with the complementary 
bodies of statutory and common law.82 The courts have generally 
been adept at sorting through the related legal sources and arriv-
ing at conclusions that do not compromise the integrity of the 
Code.83 
(justifying recognition of non-bankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy proceeding using 
"creditors" bargain model). 
81 Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity 
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating 
cause shall supplement its provisions. 
u.c.c. § 1-103 (1998). 
82 See, e.g., Palmer v. Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 641 P.2d 346, 348 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) 
(stating mat "existing general principles of law may only 'supplement' tlie Idaho U.C.C. to 
tlie extent tliey are not displaced. General principles will not be applied where tliey conflict 
witli particular provisions of tlie Code."); see also City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 208 S.E.2d 794, 
796-97 (Ga. 1974) (holding mat adoption of Georgia statute did not bar remedy tradition-
ally available under Georgia law). The court noted in City Dodge mat "while tlie [Uniform 
Commercial] Code is an attempt to make uniform tlie law ... regarding commercial trans-
actions, tlie draftsmen realized mat it could not possibly anticipate all situations." Id. at 796. 
Code section 1-103 reflects tlie draftsmen's reasoning. Id. at 796-97. 
83 See, e.g., City Dodge, 208 S.E.2d at 797 (reviewing Georgia's case law, case law of oilier 
states, and treatises supporting court's conclusion mat tort remedy for fraud exists notwitli-
standing enactment ofUCC). 
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Since the time of the Code's initial promulgation,84 the comple-
mentary statutory and common law have evolved in ways that test 
their fit with the Code. Indeed, one very good reason to revise an 
article of the Code is to appreciate that type of evolution and revisit 
the terms of the Code's relationship with the complementary law. 
Conceptions of privity, fraud, and agreement, for example, are too 
fundamental to the fabric of the law generally to imagine that they 
could remain static as transactional patterns evolve. Further, the . 
Code was first promulgated during dynamic times in the develop-
ment of our economy85 and our appreciation of transactor rights 
not dealing at arms' length has since matured.86 What fit snugly 
84 The first official text of the Code was promulgated in 1951. See William A. Schnader, 
A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 1, 1-7 (1967) (discussing history of Code enactment and ratification). In 1953, Penn-
sylvania became the first state to enact the Code. See id. at 8. New York did not enact the 
Code until 1962, after study and review by its Law Revision Commission. See id. at 9. 
85 See Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ. 1341, 
1356-58 (1948). Grant Gilmore discusses postwar changes and development in air freight 
business, industrial finance, distribution systems, mail order houses, and industrial organiza-
tion: 
In the present post-war period, following ten years of unprecedented ex-
pansion of the national productive capacity, industrial and commercial 
practices are fluid and subject to sudden change .... It is easy to predict 
that as air freight gropes its way out of its experimental stage, new legal 
patterns for controlling and financing goods in transit will develop; it is 
less easy to say what the new patterns will be .... Industrial finance, par-
ticularly in the acquisition of short term working capital, has greatly 
changed during the past ten years; it is difficult to say whether the change 
was a temporary war-production phenomenon or the beginning of a per-
manent shift in our financing habits .... It is entirely possible t}lat our dis-
tribution system is also undergoing significant change. Cooperative asso-
ciations of producers, retailers and to a lesser extent consumers, are in-
creasingly cutting the middleman's profit from the cost of marketing. Na-
tional and regional mail order houses and chain stores have the same ef-
fect. The integrated operation, with centralized control which may extend 
from the extraction of raw materials to the retail distribution of finished 
products, may become typical of the next stage of industrial organiza-
. ti on .... [I] ncrease in the range and complexity of goods and services put 
on the market will undoubtedly lead to far-reaching changes in our think-
ing about sellers' [sic] obligations. 
Id.; see also TwiNING, supra note 6, at 305 (stating that "the Code was drafted in the expecta-
tion that it would probably have to last without major alterations for a substantial period ... 
with the prospect of an increasing momentum in the rate of technological and other 
chan~e"). 
See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Con-
fessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981). 
This commercial paper [18th century mercantile bills of exchange and 
bank notes] typically passed from hand to hand in a long series of trans-
fers, ending up in the hands of strangers who knew nothing about the 
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into the statutory and common law world of the early 1960s fits less 
well now. Where the Code was once the primary place to vindicate 
individual consumer rights, for instance, there is now a panoply of 
consumer protection laws.87 While section 2-207 was once neces-
sary to confirm that agreement means "bargain," and that actions 
do in fact speak louder than words, we have come to appreciate the 
vacuity of a "last shot" rule.88 
B. Predecessor Law 
Karl Llewellyn understood the commercial law the way that Lord 
Mansfield89 and Benjamin Cardozo90 understood the law generally. 
original transaction or about earlier transfers of the bill or note and had 
no way of finding out about them. The need to protect the strangers who 
bought the paper in the market, even at the cost of doing harm to the ob-
ligors and earlier holders, was the compelling reason that led the courts to 
elaborate the good faith purchaser, or holder in due course, idea in nego-
tiable instruments law. 
Id. at 612-13 (footnote omitted). The most outrageous thing about article 3, a statute 
drafted in the 1940s, is that there is no reference, in text or comment, to the then rapidly 
developing body of case law holding that finance companies and banks to which consumer 
notes were negotiated could not hold the notes free of the consumer's contract defenses 
because of their close connection with the dealer-sellers. See id. at 619; see also Karl N. 
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Qy.ality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341, 404-09 (1937) (de-
scribing increasing availability of "tort-like" damages to "helpless" consumers who bring 
claims against manufacturers to recover for injuries sustained due to defective products). 
87 See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1998) (prohibiting 
discrimination in credit transactions); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t 
(1998) (requiring credit reporting agencies to use fair and equitable procedures); Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692m (1998) (preventing abusive debt collec-
tion); Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1998) (promoting 
clear and comprehensive warranties for consumer products); Truth in Lending Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (1998) (promoting consumers access to credit terms); FTC Trade 
Regulation Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain 
Other Locations, 16 C.F.R § 429 (1998) (providing consumers with option to cancel sale); 
Consumer Reporting Agency Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 93, §§ 50-68 (Law. Co-op. 1985 
& Supp. 1994) (regulating consumer credit reports); Credit Services Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445.1701-.1708 (West Supp. 1994); Retail Installment Sales Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 
17:16C-27 (West 1984) (setting provisions for retail installment sales); see also MICHAEL M. 
GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND 
CONSUMERS 1-6 (1995) (discussing development of consumer protection law in twentieth 
century). 
88 SeeU.C.C. § 2-207 (Discussion Draft Mar. 1, 1998) (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc2/ucc2298.htm> (on file with author) (discussing sec-
tion 2-207 "Road Map" to interpreting which terms are in contract formed under article 2). 
89 See Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401-02 (KB. 1758) (Mansfield, J.) (outlining 
holder in due course doctrine). 
90 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-52 (1921). 
Cardozo believed, for example, that adherence to precedent should be relaxed when a rule 
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That is, Llewellyn appreciated that for the enacted and codified 
commercial law to be vital, for it to really matter in commercial 
transactions, it must be considerate of its antecedents.91 Just as it 
would not make good sense to draft commercial law without regard 
to the way businesspeople do business,92 it would be shortsighted, 
and ultimately ineffective, to draft comprehensive and preemptive 
commercial legislation95 without regard to the evolving and evolved 
commercial contracting principles. 
This point, applied to the current effort to revise article 2, is so 
simple that it might go unappreciated: the lawyers drafting the re-
vision must understand and appreciate the current article 2 law. 
This type of appreciation is not gleaned merely from a familiarity 
with the cases, but from a sense of the problematic language in the 
current formulations of the law. To appreciate the current law is 
to understand how it works "warts and all" and to recognize that 
even the adjustment that merely "cleans up" problematic language 
comes with a cost: the cost of courts and litigants coming to terms 
with new terms, that might, in the fullness of time, manifest a new 
and perhaps more intractable set of problems. The drafters must 
start with a respect for the law that they are revising; all presump-
that "has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of 
justice or with the social welfare." Id. at 150. Commenting on the judicial role with respect 
to the development of the common law, Cardozo stated: "If judges have woefully 
misinterpreted the 'TIUlT'es of their day, or if the 'T/UlT'es of their day are no longer those of ours, 
they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors." Id. at 152. 
91 See Llewellyn, supra note 86, at 409 (concluding it is better to let policy be rebuilt as 
facts change rather than enacting statutes which are quickly outdated). 
92 See, e.g., 'TWINING, supra note 6, at 304-05 (noting that UCC's drafters treated busi-
nesspeople as Code's "principal addressees"); Gilmore, supra note 85, at 1341 (asserting that 
draftsmen of commercial law attempted to state as matter of law meaning that business 
com~unity gives to transaction). 
See Hawkland, supra note 22, at 291-92. 
Id. 
[T] here is a vast difference between a "code" and a "statute" .... A "code" 
is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole 
field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its subject 
area save only that which the code excepts. It is systematic in that all of its 
parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent termi-
nology, form an interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan and 
containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is suffi-
ciently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in ac-
cordance with its own basic policies . 
. . . A mere statute, on the other hand, is neither pre-emptive, systematic, 
nor comprehensive, and, therefore, its methodology is different from that 
of a code. 
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tions must be made in favor of the status quo; change for change's 
sake (or because a law professor on the drafting committee has 
always had a question about a statutory turn of phrase) is to be 
avoided at all costs. 
Llewellyn was first a student of the law and then a drafter of it. 
His work on the sociological and historic antecedents of the war-
ranty law were indispensable to his appreciation of what warranty 
can do, and what warranty cannot do. His formulation of the con-
tract formation provisions of article 2,94 in their aggressive disre-
gard for consideration,95 reveal an understanding of where the law 
had been, as well as where a statute could urge it to go. The better 
commercial law guides more than it compels. Drafters of revised 
commercial law ignore existing law at their peril. 
C. The Warranty Example 
The warranty is the deal: insofar as a contract for sale (like any 
other contract) is a relatively fixed allocation of risk, and insofar as 
the warranty provision fixes, to a large extent, prospective (and, 
therefore, less predictable) risk, the warranty provision determines 
what it is that the seller is selling and the buyer is buying. To make 
the point more stark, we would propose that, from the perspective 
of the sales law, there is more affinity between the sale of a fifteen 
dollar electric can opener sold with a warranty and a luxury car 
sold with a warranty than there is between one large car sold with a 
warranty and another sold with no warranties. While this might 
border on hyperbole, it captures well our reasons for focusing on 
the Article 2 Drafting Committee's treatment of warranties as a 
means to inform critique of the article 2 revision project. 
In this section of the Article we consider the foundations of war-
ranty in terms that are pertinent to the "evolution" of warranty law 
94 See U.C.C. §§ 1-103 (stating "[s]upplementary General Principles of Law Applica-
ble"), 1-201(3) ("Agreement"), 1-201(11) ("Contract"), 1-205 ("Course of Dealing and Us-
age of Trade"), 2-204 ("Formation in General"), 2-205 ("Firm Olfers"), 2-206 ("Offer and 
Acceptance in Formation of Contract"), 2-207 ("Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confir-
mation" ["Battle of the Forms"]), 2-208 ("Course of Performance or Practical Consttuc-
tion") (1998). 
95 Code sections 2-205 and 2-209, for example, which refer to Firm Olfers and to Modi-
fication, Recission and Waiver respectively, state that consideration is not necessary either to 
keep open an offer or to modify a contract. See id. §§ 2-205, 2-209 (1998). These sections 
altered the common law requirement that firm offers and modifications be supported by 
consideration. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES§§ 2-205:01, 
2-209:01 (1998). 
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that would be effected by the revision. We demonstrate that be-
cause the drafters failed to appreciate warranty in the way Llewel-
lyn did a proposed provision of the warranty regime is inconsider-
ate of the commercial "big picture" and, therefore, not responsive 
to the needs of contemporary commercial transactors. And what 
we find most disturbing is the failure of the drafters to do the nec-
essary "homework" that would have revealed the inadequacies of 
the regime they propose. That is the flaw in the process that un-
ravels the draft revision. It is a striking, and, we believe, a fatal 
shortcoming. 
An early case, Randall v. Newson,96 sketches the substance of war-
ranty. After reviewing Randall we turn to the un~erstanding of 
warranty that informed the current article 2 scheme. 
1. Randall v. Newson 
In this classic warranty case, the plaintiff (buyer) of a phaeton 
for two horses complained that the defendant (seller) had supplied 
a pole for the phaeton that "was so carelessly and negligently made, 
and of such bad and improper wood"97 that the pole failed while 
the plaintiff was driving the phaeton and caused damage to the 
horses. The phaeton had originally been designed for one horse, 
but the plaintiff had caused the defendant to make the adjust-
ments that would accommodate the phaeton's supporting two 
horses.98 The lower court characterized plaintiff's claim as sound-
ing in negligence and reasoned that as long as no negligence on 
the part of defendant was shown, defendant faced no liability.99 
The jury found for defendant, awarding plaintiff damages only in 
the amount of three pounds, the cost of the pole.100 
Queen's Bench reformulated the issue: 
[W] hat, [in the contract of sale in issue], is the implied undertak-
ing of the seller as to the efficiency of the pole? Is it an absolute 
warranty that the pole shall be reasonably fit for the purpose, or is 
it only partially to that effect, limited to defects which might be 
96 2 Q.B.D. 102 (C.A. 1877). 
97 Id. at 103 (stating that judgment for three pounds was ordered for plaintiff upon 
jury's finding). 
98 See id. at 105. 
99 See id. (stating principle of merchantability and implied fitness for particular purpose 
of carriage support). 
100 See id. 
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discovered by care and skill?101 
Or, in the most direct terms, is a seller's warranty liability a matter 
of negligence? In the course of answering that question, the court 
provides a thoughtful, and prescient statement of the sum and sub-
stance of the warranty undertaking: 
The governing principle ... is that the thing offered and deliv-
ered under a contract of purchase and sale must answer the de-
scription of it which is contained in words in the contract, or which 
would be so contained if the contract were accurately drawn out . . . . If 
the article or commodity offered or delivered does not in fact an-
swer the description of it in the contract, it does not do so more 
or less because the defect in it is patent, or latent, or discover-
able.102 
Plaintiff's appeal succeeded.103 There are three pedagogical points 
to be gleaned from the brief excerpt from the holding: ( 1) the 
terms of the seller's warranty may be expressly stated in terms of 
the contract - this demonstrates the contract basis of warranty, 
(2) as seen in the underscored language, the warranty may be im-
plied - this is consistent with a contract-bargain model of implied 
warranty,104 and (3) the negligence of the seller is inapposite -
however, this would seem mitigated by the fact that the seller is 
held to the warranty that may be implied by context. 
The decision is seminal in that it captures the coalescence of 
what are formulated as three separate bases of warranty liability in 
article 2: the express warranty of section 2-313,105 the implied war-
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 109 (emphasis added). 
10
' See id. at 111. 
104 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its 
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 834-36 (1985) (arguing that, in debtor-creditor rela-
tionship, law should provide contracting parties with rights they would bargain for if they 
had time and money to do it); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corpurate Cuntrol 
Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1982) (stating that most efficient fiduciary rules form 
bargains that investors and agents would arrive at if bargaining had no transactional costs); 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the just Compensatiun 
Principle: Some Notes un an Enfurcement Model and a Theary of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 
554, 588 n.87 (1977) (stating that in costless environment contracts would be enforced on 
their terms alone, however due to transaction costs law specifies legal consequences of typi-
cal bargains). 
105 See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1998). Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, 
Sample: 
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ranty of merchantability of section 2-314,106 and the implied war-
ranty of fitness for particular purpose in section 2-315. 107 These 




(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the de-
scription. 
(~) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform 
to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the 
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he 
have a specific intention ·to make a warranty, but an affirmation 
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be 
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not . 
create a warranty. 
106 See i.J.C.C. § 2-314 (1998). Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the 
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if 
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this 
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either 
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the de-
scription; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container 
or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316) other implied warranties 
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
107 See id.§ 2-315 (1998). Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is re-
lying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, 
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
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2. What Warranty Liability Is 
Warranty under article 2 of the UCC is essentially what warranty 
was for Queens Bench in Randall v. Newson. Warranty is the prod-
uct of the "illicit intercourse of tort and contract," as Prosser so 
colorfully put it. 108 It is what happens when contract risk is formu-
lated in terms of transactor expectations; and warranty is, as well, 
defined by the remedy for its breach.109 
Each of the principal article 2 warranties of quality, the express 
warranty provided by section 2-313, as well as the implied warran-
ties of sections 2-314 ("Merchantability") and 2-315 ("Fitness for 
Particular Purpose") represent the combination of contract and 
tort principles.no While thatjanus-like tension is borne out in nu-
merous ways, the duality is starkly presented in each of the three 
provisions. 
The express warranty section contemplates that "affirmations of 
fact or promises" that became "a part of the basis of the bargain" 
may be express warranties.m The affirmations would be express 
terms of the parties' contract. However, before a court can con-
clude that a particular representation satisfies that test, the court 
must be confident that the defendant-seller's representation was 
not "merely puffing," or "dealer's talk."112 To determine whether 
the representation is such an affirmation or promise rather than 
puffing, the court will consider the transactional context and focus 
on the transactors' relative sophistication.113 
108 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE 
LJ. 1099, 1126 (1960). 
109 See, e.g., Randall v. Newson, 2 Q.B.D. 102, 111 (CA 1877) (stating thatjury should 
decide both liability and damages). 
110 See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-315. 
111 Redmac, Inc. v. Computerland of Peoria, 489 N.E.2d 380, 382 (lli. App. Ct. 1986) 
(finding no clear distinction between express warranties and mere puffing). 
112 See, e.g., Pell City Wood, Inc. v. Forke Bros. Auctioneers, Inc., 474 So. 2d 694, 695 
(Ala. 1985) (holding that auctioneer's statements that trucks were "in good condition" and 
"ready to work tomorrow" were clear examples of "puffing," and did not "rise to the level of 
an express warranty"); Redmac, 489 N.E.2d at 382 (stating that "[s]ales talk which relates only 
to the value of the goods or the seller's personal opinion or commendation of the goods is 
considered puffing and is not binding on the seller"); Miller v. Lentine, 495 A.2d 1229, 1231 
(Me. 1985) (stating that "puffing" denotes "praise of goods by the seller"). 
m See, e.g., Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(explaining that where buyer and seller have equal knowledge of facts surrounding product, 
seller's statement as to that product creates no express warranty); Miller, 495 A.2d at 1231 
(stating that circumstances of agreements and relative knowledge of contracting parties are 
significant factors to consider in finding express warranty); Lovington Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. 
Abbott Lab., 642 P.2d 167, 170 (N.M. 1982) (stating that "[a]ll of the circumstances of a sale 
are to be considered when determining whether there was an express warranty or a mere 
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The section 2-314 implied warranty of merchantability may arise 
from contractual "promises or affirmations of fact made on the 
container or label." 114 The provision also contemplates that the 
court will determine whether the goods were, for example, "fit for 
their ordinary purposes," or "will pass without objection in the 
trade. "115 The court must consult general transactor expectations 
in order to determine whether the seller's tender was, in fact, rea-
sonable under the circumstances.116 That reference to industry 
norms is explicit in subsection (3), which invokes usages of trade117 
· to determine the sum and substance of an implied warranty of 
merchantability. The alternative tests of merchantability in subsec-
tion 2-314(2) are illustrative, not exhaustive. 118 Further, the mer~ 
chantability warranty arises only when the goods in issue are sold 
by a "merchant," and the section 2-104 definition of that term in-
vokes the language of tort. 119 
expression of opinion"). 
114 u.c.c. § 2-314(2)(£). 
115 Id.§ 2-314(2) (a), (c). 
116 See, e.g., Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 1331, 1332 (Mass. 1989) 
(applying "reasonable expectations" test to determine whether consumer should have ex-
pected to find injury-causing substance in his food); Dempsey v. Rosenthal, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
441, 445-46 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (finding that seller of pedigree dog reasonably should as-
sume that buyer wants to breed it). 
117 See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1998): 
Id. 
Id. 
Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade 
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regular-
ity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation 
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The 
existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is estab-
lished that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar 
writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court. 
118 See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 6. This section states: 
Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "merchant-
able" nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the 
text of the statute, but arising by usage of trade or through case law. The 
language used is "must be at least such as ... ,"and the intention is to leave 
open other possible attributes of merchantability. 
119 See U.C.C. § 2-104 (1998) (stating that merchant is one "who deals in goods of the 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar 
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may 
be attributed"); see also Cropper v. Rego Distribution Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1153-54 
(D. Del. 1982) (analyzing whether defendant was "merchant" in context of breach of im-
plied warranty claim in personal injury action); Ferragarno v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
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The section 2-315 fitness for particular purpose warranty is for-
mulated in terms that require comparison of the transactors' rea-
sonable expectations. 120 The warranty only arises when the seller 
has reason to know that the buyer is actually relying on the seller's 
expertise. In such a case the seller has the duty contemplated by 
the implied warranty. 121 The seller's duty may, of course, be in-
ferred from the incidents of the contract between buyer and seller, 
for instance, what each said to the other.122 
A significant aspect of the Code's provision of those three bases 
of warranty liability is their simultaneously alternative and cumula-
tive coincidence. The same goods in the same transaction may 
breach more than one of the three warranties.123 In fact, the same 
factual predicate may support all three theories.124 Keep in mind, 
too, that the warranty theories may cooperate with other seller li-
ability theories, premised, for example, on negligence, 125 misrepre-
Auth., 481 N.E.2d 477, 480-82 (Mass. 1985) (discussing whether defendant qualified as 
merchant in wrongful death action). 
120 See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1998) (stating that "(w]here the seller at the time of contracting 
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the 
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods"). 
121 Thus, a seller's duty with respect to an implied warranty is similar to Justice Cardozo's 
negligence standard in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (stat-
ing negligence standard as "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of ap-
prehension "). 
122 See, e.g., Crawford v. Gold Kist, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 682, 687-88 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (illus-
trating that communication between contracting parties may fail to determine existence of 
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose). 
123 See, e.g., Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. United Tech. Corp., 35 F.3d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 
1994) (holding that express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability arose from 
certificate of conformance which stated fuel controls were "serviceable"); Soaper v. Hope 
Indus., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 493, 495 (S.C. 1992) (finding that because particular purpose for 
which product is purchased was also ordinary or intended purpose of product, warranties of 
merchantability and of fitness combine). 
124 See, e.g., Fiberglass Component Prod., Inc. v. Riechhold Chems., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 
948, 953-55 (D. Colo. 1997) (allowing buyer to sue for breach of express and implied war-
ranties due to claims made by manufacturer's representative); L.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Town-
send Grain & Feed Co., 163 B.R. 709, 719-22 (D. Del. 1994) (holding that breach of both 
express and implied warranties arose from statements regarding effectiveness of herbicides 
and actual application process); Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E.2d 19, 
23-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (allowing buyer of coil heating units to sue for breach of merchan-
tibili~, express warranty, and implied warranty of fitness). 
12 See, e.g., Lim Enters. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 912 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(holding that facts would support claim under tort or contract law); Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug 
Co., 467 S.E.2d 558, 561-62 (Ga. 1996) (stating that failure to adequately package bleach 
allowed claims of negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability); cf. Lagalo 
v. Allied Corp., 554 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) rev'd cm other grounds, 577 N.W. 
2d 462 (1998) (stating that plaintiff could bring suit under both negligence and implied 
warranty theories). 
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. 126 d . d l" b"l" 127 sentatlon, an stnct pro ucts 1a 1 1ty. 
Appreciating the article 2 warranty provisions as, to varying de-
grees perhaps, the coincidence of contract and tort requires some 
extended consideration of the contract and tort characteristics of 
warranty liability. Once these characteristics are understood we 
may come to terms with the deficiencies of the proposed revision. 
a. Contracts 
The part of warranty most redolent of contract is the privity re-
quirement.128 Insofar as contractual relations are, at least in theory, 
consensual, the fundamental premise is that there be something 
like a meeting of the minds between contracting parties. Notions 
of privity are consistent with that predisposition. The privity ele-
ment of warranty was crucial to the development of sections 2-313, 
2-314, and 2-315 of the UCC. Each of these sections responded to 
the problem of deficient goods that fail, and, in failing, occasion-
ally hurt people. 
There are two kinds of privity in the warranty law: vertical privity 
- privity from one level of the distributive chain to the next; and 
horizontal privity - privity among those at the same level of distri-
bution.129 The fact that privity is a requisite for the maintenance of 
126 See, e.g., Mainline Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1104-08 
(D. Vt. 1996) (allowing claim for negligent misrepresentation and breach of express war-
ranty); IHP Indus., Inc. v. PermAlert, 947 F. Supp. 257, 261 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (allowing 
claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and implied warranty from statement by seller's 
employee that pipes could withstand pressure); Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 936 
P.2d 1191, 1198-99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that claims for misrepresentation and 
breach of express warranty arose from statements about seed quality). 
127 See, e.g., Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 583-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (stat-
ing that jury could have found defects in design, manufacturing, and marketing of seatbelt); 
cf. Commonwealth v.Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1326-27 (Mass. 1997) (equating 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability with sale of "unreasonably dangerous" item 
under § 402A of Restatement for failure to warn); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 253 
N.E.2d 207, 210 (N.Y. 1969) (observing "strict liability in tort and implied warranty in ab-
sence of privity are merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action"). 
128 See 2JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN H. BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACI"S § 5.11, at 54-55 
(ed. rev. 1995). 
129 See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 904 n.l (Pa. 1974). The court 
states the following in this case: 
The "vertical" privity chain begins at the retailer and continues through 
any number of levels to the manufacturer of the defective product. The 
question of vertical privity is "who can be sued"? The question of hori-
zontal privity is "who can sue"? The purchaser can sue the retail seller 
because they are in privity. When the requirement of vertical privity has 
been abolished, he may also sue any other entity in the distributive 
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a warranty action was one reason for the development of strict 
products liability. Strict products liability provides the means to 
impose liability on the manufacturer of a defective product irre-
spective of the existence of privity. 130 Thus, in strict products liabil-
ity, a direct contract relation, between the plaintiff-buyer and de-
fendant-seller, need not be found. 131 
Article 2 of the UCC includes section 2-318, which concerns 
"Third Party Beneficiaries" of the Code's express and implied war-
ranties.132 There are three iterations of the third party beneficiary 
provision. Alternative A,133 the first formulation, was promulgated 
as part of original article 2;134 this was a time when the development 
of products liability theories was embryonic.135 Alternative A is the 
most restrictive, limiting the seller's warranty liability to the buyer 
and those in the buyer's household. Alternatives Band Care each 




ISO See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 98, at 692 
(5th ed. 1984). 
131 See id. 
Id. 
132 See V.C.C. § 2-318 (1998). 
133 See id. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied. 
Alternative A 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural 
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in 
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume 
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the 
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
134 See HAWKLAND, supra note 95, at 678 (obseIVing that when first official Code was 
promulgated in 1952, section 2-318 was identical to present Alternative A). 
135 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 130, at 693 (stating that "those who drafted the Uni-
form Commercial Code did so at a point in time when a tort theory was not openly recog-
nized as such"). See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791-848 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel] 
(examining revolutionary changes in product liability). 
136 See V.C.C. § 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied which 
states in part: 
Alternative B 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by 
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller 
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
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Each of the three alternatives of section 2-318 concern only hori-
zontal privity. None has anything to say about vertical privity, the 
consumer's right to proceed directly against the manufacturer who 
sold goods in breach of an express or implied warranty. 137 
A leading case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 1gs decided in 
1960, when the fit between strict products liability and warranty was 
being forged, recognized the limited utility of a privity analysis in 
the warranty law: 
Id. 
The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods devel-
oped their place in the law when marketing conditions were sim-
ple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to face on an 
equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were 
relatively uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer 
competent to evaluate their quality .... With the advent of mass 
marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the purchaser, 
sales were accomplished through intermediaries, and the de-
mand for the.product was created by the advertising media. 
Although only a minority of jurisdictions have thus far departed 
from the requirement of privity, the movement in that direction 
is most certainly gathering momentum. Liability to the ultimate 
Alternative C 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person 
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the 
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. 
m Several courts, however, distinguish between express and implied warranties in their 
analyses of whether lack of privity can stand as a bar to recovery. See, e.g., Collins Co. v. Car-
boline Co., 532 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ill. 1988) (discussing that express warranty is implied by 
contract but implied warranty is imposed by Jaw); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. 
Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 323 (D. Md. 1983) (holding that vertical privity is not 
required for recovery for breach of implied warranty); Dravo Equip. Co. v. German, 698 
P.2d 63, 65 (Or. CL App. 1985) (stating that express warranties should extend to remote 
purchasers, but implied warranties should not extend beyond original transaction). 
138 161A2d69, 97 (NJ. 1960) (holding that disclaimer of implied warranty ofmerchan-
tibility should be invalidated as against public welfare). Bloomfield Motors, a Plymouth 
dealer, sold a car to Claude Henningsen, who communicated to the dealer his intention to 
give the car to his wife. See id. at 73. A couple of weeks later, as Mrs. Henningsen was driving 
the car, a sudden mechanical failure caused her to lose control of the automobile, resulting· 
in an accident in which she was injured and the car badly damaged. See id. at 75. The Hen-
ningsens sued the dealer and the manufacturer under negligence and breach of warranty 
theories. See id. at 73. The court held the manufacturer could be held liable although priv-
ity of contract was not shown. See id. at 83-84. 
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consumer in the absence of direct contractual connection has 
been predicated upon a variety of theories. Some courts hold 
that the warranty runs with the article like a covenant running 
with land; others recognize a third-party beneficiary thesis; still 
others rest their decision on the ground that public policy re-
quires recognition of a warranty made directly to the consumer.139 
While Henningsen was certainly one of the more articulate state-
ments of the evolving view toward privity in warranty actions,140 it 
was not unique. The next section of this Article reviews a decision 
where the court appreciated the relationship between warranty 
theory and the strict products liability law, in terms that ultimately 
reveal the incongruity of the Article 2 Drafting Committee's formu-
lation of the sales warranties. 
b. Tort 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel 
Boiler Co.,141 held that plaintiff's lack of horizontal privity with the 
defendant manufacturer did not bar plaintiff's suit for damages. 
This holding came after the State had abrogated the necessity of 
vertical privity in warranty cases142 in recognition of strict liability 
theory. 143 The court concluded that the significant development of 
the products liability law had rendered the privity conception im-
potent in the warranty law: because privity does not matter under 
section 402A of the Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts,144 it 
139 Id. at 81-82. 
140 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citade~ supra note 135, at 793. 
141 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974). 
142 See Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 855-56 (Pa. 1968) (addressing breach of 
warranty in action involving misrepresentations about drugs included in cattle feed mix· 
ture). 
143 See Webb v. Zem, 220 A.2d 853, 854-55 (Pa. 1966) (holding plaintiff was allowed to 
amend complaint to include theory of strict liability for exploding beer keg). 
144 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SPECIAL LIABIU1Y OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER§ 402A (1965). This section reads: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or 
to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although 
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would be nonsensical for it to matter in the warranty law. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recounted its conclusion in an earlier 
case abrogating any vertical privity requirement: 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, once a breach of warranty 
has been shown, the defendant's liability, assuming of course the 
presence of proximate cause and damages, is absolute. Lack of 
negligence on the seller's part is no defense. Therefore, prior to 
the adoption of 402a, it could be said that to dispense with privity 
would be to allow recovery in contract without proof of negli-
gence, while requiring a showing of negligence in order to re-
cover for the same wrong against the same defendant if suit were 
brought in tort. To permit the result of a lawsuit to depend solely on the 
caption atop plaintiffs complaint is not now, and has never been, a 
sound resolution of identical controversies. 145 
That observation, relating to the privity issues, is fundamental to a 
critique of the products liability law and revised article 2 warranty 
scheme. It also reveals the incongruity that would emerge from 
the Drafting Committee's failure to appreciate the warranty law. as 
it would become under the revision. 
Insofar as the UCC warranties are, at least in some measure, the 
product of tort principles, 146 it is not particularly disquieting that 
privity conceptions should be abandoned either by the statute or 
by the courts' construction of the statute. 147 Our issue with the revi-
sion's warranty provisions is not with the death of privity, it is with 
the Committee's failure to appreciate the consequences of their 
reformulation of the warranty law for the fit between a revised arti-
cle 2 and the complementary law. 
Id. 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his ·product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into 
any contractual relation with the seller. 
145 Kassab, 246 A2d at 853 (emphasis added). 
146 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citade~ supra note 135, at 800-01 (explaining influence of 
tort law on Sales Act and UCC). 
147 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A2d 69, 100 (NJ. 1960) (stating that 
"awareness" of evolution of warranty from tort makes accepting relaxing privity concepts 
easier). 
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3. What Warranty Would Become 
At the time current article 2 was promulgated by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute ("ALI"), the law of 
products liability was in flux. The drafters of the Code recognized 
that the warranty provisions would have to fit with established 
commercial practice and not undermine the development of com-
plementary bodies of law. Further, the current Code's warranty 
provisions were consistent with the law governing the quality of 
goods as it had evolved up to the time of the Code's promulga-
tion.148 Finally, the Code, when first enacted, was supposed to be a 
"Code."149 That is, the drafters were sensitive to the need for con-
sistency from one article to the next. While there may not be per-
fect symmetry, the instances of conflict do not undermine the 
whole. 
The Drafting Committee's revision of article 2's warranty provi-
sions does not compare favorably with the current law. The draft is 
inconsiderate of the complementary sources of law and fails to ap-
preciate the balance struck by the predecessor law. 
Strict products liability is, largely, a response to the deficiencies 
of the application of negligence and warranty principles to the 
problem of products that hurt people. If an injured buyer of a 
good sues the defendant manufacturer in negligence, the buyer 
must establish that the manufacturer breached a duty to the buyer. 
Establishing the elements of that negligence action is, at best, ex-
pensive and problematic,150 and, in any event, would often frustrate 
public policy.151 A manufacturer who puts a dangerous product in 
the stream of commerce should bear the costs of accidents caused 
by that product.152 Whether one is sympathetic to that view, if 
148 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of QJJ.ality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 
699, 701-08 (1936) (examining common law birth and development of warranty of quality). 
149 Code is defined as "a systematic collection, compendium or revision of laws, rules, or 
regulations." BIACK'SLAWDICTIONARY257 (6th ed. 1990). 
150 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 438-40 (Cal. 1944) (describ-
ing and examining, in context of res ipsa loquitur, chain of control over soda bottle prior to 
its explosion in plaintiff's hand). 
15 See id. at 440-41 (Traynor,]., concurring) (endorsing strict liability for manufacturers 
because of their unique ability to prevent harm to consumers). 
152 Under this regime, the costs of accidents caused by defective products do not fall 
upon the injured, "who are powerless to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (finding strict liability for manufacture design 
defects of power tool). 
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manufacturer liability is the goal, negligence theory is a rough way 
to get there. 
Just as the tort negligence theory might leave something to be 
desired, the contract/tort warranty theory alone may be deficient. 
In order to prevail in a warranty action, and assuming that the 
plaintiff-buyer can establish that a warranty arose in the transac-
tion, the plaintiff-buyer must establish three things: (1) that the 
warranty has not been effectively disclaimed, (2) that the buyer is 
in privity with the defendant-seller, and (3) that the plaintiff-buyer 
provided the defendant-seller notice of the breach of warranty. m 
Those requisites, just as the elements of a negligence action, may 
not serve a greater societal interest in holding manufacturer's li-
able for the iajuries caused by their products. 
It is in the breach between the negligence and warranty law that 
strict products liability takes purchase. 
In the early 1960s, American courts began to recognize that a 
commercial seller of any product having a manufacturing defect 
should be liable in tort for harm caused by the defect regardless 
of the plaintiff's ability to maintain a traditional negligence or 
warranty action. Liability attached even if the manufacturer's 
quality control in producing the defective product was reason-
able. A plaintiff was not required to be in direct privity with the 
defendant seller to bring an action. Strict liability in tort for 
defectively manufactured products, merges the concept of im-
plied warranty, in which negligence is not required, with the tort 
concept of negligence, in which contractual privity is not re-
quired.154 
So any reformulation of warranty theory in a revised article 2 must 
be considerate of the development of strict products liability law. 
The reformulation of warranty law under revised article 2 would 
enhance the ability of those personally injured to recover damages 
based on breach of warranty as the warranties are defined by article 
2. However, if the products law has evolved to the point where it 
responds to socioeconomic problems that were once the sole prov-
153 See id. at 899-900. 154 REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y § 1 cmt. a (Proposed Final 
Draft, Apr. 1, 1997); see also id. at§ 2(a) (stating that "(a] product ... contains a manufactur-
ing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care 
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product"). 
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ince of warranty and negligence law, then warranty need not cover 
the same ground in terms that might assure different results in 
legally identical cases: "To permit the result of a lawsuit to depend 
solely on the caption atop plaintiff's complaint is not now, and has 
never been, a sound resolution of identical controversies."155 
The members of the Article 2 Drafting Committee· have so ig-
nored the legal context into which they would inject a new concep-
tion of product warranties that, in fact, legal results would change 
depending upon "the caption atop plaintiff's complaint" under the 
proposed law. 156 While the coexistence of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, negligence, and strict products liability doctrine 
could continue to make sense under a revised sales law, the coor-
dination of the merchantability warranty and strict products liabil-
ity law must assure that distinctions among the causes of action 
retain substance. Otherwise, there is no reason for the law to rec-
ognize alternatives that might confound transactor expectations 
and yield uncommercial results. 
Members of the Article 2 Drafting Committee are cognizant of 
the tension between the implied warranty of merchantability and 
strict products liability theories in the personal injury law. To 
make clear that the tests for merchantability and defectiveness 
would be consistent with one another, the Committee decided to 
describe the merchantability I defect relationship in a note rather 
than in the black letter:157 
When recovery is sought for injury to person or property that al-
legedly resulted from manufacturing or design defects in goods 
sold or inadequate warnings, the applicable state law of products 
liability determines whether the goods are merchantable under 
Section 2-404 [the Implied Warranty of Merchantability provi-
sion]. Merchantability in the context of a claim to recover for in-
jury to person or property is synonymous with the level of safety 
required for the goods as a matter of public policy adopted by the 
courts of this state or, if applicable, the restatement of the Law 
155 Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (Pa. 1968) (discussing financially sophisti-
cated manufacturers escaping liability due to no privity of contract). 
156 See id. (discussing that warranties should not run only to middleman retailers, but 
also to ultimate consumers). 
157 See U.C.C. § 2-404, note 4 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998); see aLsoAlces & Frisch, supra 
note 4, at 436-41, 447-57 (discussing purposes and consequences of producing comments to 
Code, which allows drafters to "state the reasons and arguments for their decisions"). 
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Id. 
(Third), Torts: Products Liability. 
When, however, the claim for injury to person or property is 
based on an implied warranty of fitness [for Particular Purpose] 
under Section 2-405158 o_r representations made by the seller to 
the buyer, such as affirmations or promises about or descriptions 
of the goods, this Article determines whether an implied warranty 
of fitness was made or breached and whether the promises, af-
firmations or descriptions create contractual warranties to which 
the goods must conform, 159 as well as the remedies available for 
158 See U.C.C. § 2-405 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). This section states: 
Subject to section 2-406, if a seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the 
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suit-
able goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods are fit for that 
purpose. 
159 See U.C.C. § 2-408 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). 
Extension of Express Warranty to Remote Buyer and Transferee. 
(a) In this section, "goods" means new goods and goods that are sold as 
new goods. 
(b) If a seller makes a representation or a promise relating to goods on or 
in a container, on a label, in a record, or that is otherwise packaged 
with or accompanies the goods and authorizes another person to fur-
nish the representation or promise to a remote buyer and it is so fur-
nished, the seller has an obligation to the remote buyer and its trans-
feree, and in the case of a remote consumer buyer, to any member of 
the family or household of the remote consumer buyer or a guest in 
the house of the remote consumer buyer, that the goods will conform 
to the representation or that the promise will be performed, unless a 
reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer would not be-
lieve the representation or promise or would believe that any repre-
sentation was merely of the value of the goods or purported to be 
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods. 
(c) If a seller makes a representation or a promise relating to the goods 
in a medium for communication to the public, including advertising, 
and a remote buyer with knowledge ()f the representation or promise 
buys or leases the goods from a person [in the normal chain of distri-
bution) the seller has an obligation to the remote buyer and, in the 
case of a remote consumer buyer, to any member of the family or 
household of the remote consumer buyer or a guest in the home of 
the remote consumer buyer, that the goods will conform to the repre-
sentation, or that the promise will be performed, 
Alternative A [current draft) 
unless a reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer would 
not believe the representation or promise or would believe that the 
representation was merely of the value of the goods or purported to 
be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods. 
63 
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damage proximately resulting from any nonconformity. 160 
The membership of the ALI, at its May, 1997 Annual Meeting, 
where the Draft Revision was presented, adopted the following 
language in substitute for the comment proposed by the drafters 
and reproduced above: "When recovery is sought for injury to per-
son or property, whether goods are merchantable is to be deter-
mined by applicable state products liability law."161 In response to 
that ALI action, the Reporters of the Article 2 Drafting Committee 
state that " [ w] hatever the intent, there clearly was no intention to 
preclude actions for injury to person or property under sections 2-
405 or 2-403 and 2-408."162 
Id. 
Alternative B 
unless the remote buyer does not believe the representation or prom-
ise or a reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer would 
not believe the representation or promise or would believe that the 
representation was merely of the seller's opinion or commendation of 
the goods. 
(d) An obligation may be created under this section even though the 
seller does not use formal words, such as "warranty" or "guaranty." 
(e) An obligation arising under this section is breached when the goods 
are received by the remote buyer if the goods, at the time they left the 
seller's control, did not conform to any representation made, or if the 
promise is not performed when due. 
(f) The following rules apply to the remedies for breach of an obligation 
created under this section: 
(1) A seller under subsections (b) and (c) may modify or limit the remedies 
available to a remote buyer for breach, but a modification or limitation 
is not effective unless it is communicated to the remote buyer with the 
representation or promise. 
(2) Damages may be proved in any manner that is reasonable. Unless spe-
cial circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount; 
(A) the measure of damages if the goods do not conform to a 
representation is the value of the goods as represented 
less the value of the goods as delivered; and 
(B) the measure of damages for breach of a promise is the 
value of the promised performance less the value of any 
performance made. 
(3) Absent a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in breach under 
this section is liable for incidental or consequential damages under sec-
tions 2-805 and 2-806, but is not liable for consequential damages for a 
remote buyer's lost profits; 
( 4) An action for breach of an obligation under this section accrues for 
purposes of sections 2-814 when the obligation is breached as provided 
in subsection (e). 
(g) This section is subject to Section 2-409(b). 
160 U.C.C. § 2-404, note 4 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). 
161 20 A.L.I. REP. 4 (Fall 1997). 
162 U.C.C. § 2-404, note 4 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). 
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The Drafting Committee may well be correct that the ALI re-
ported its actions erroneously and will take action to make clear 
that nothing in the strict products liability law preempts the ex-
press warranty and implied warranty of fitness for particular pur-
pose provisions. But it is not so clear that there is reason to main-
tain an article 2 warranty cause of action for personal injury.163 The 
strict products liability law, as noted above, was a response to the 
deficiencies of warranty theory so far as personal injury is con-
cerned.164 Now that strict products liability theory has evolved, the 
deficiencies of the warranty law are obviated so far as personal in-
jury is concerned and a revised article 2 could be limited in scope 
to economic loss.165 
Most troubling, if members of the Drafting Committee are right 
and breach of an express warranty or implied warranty of fitness 
for particular purpose can provide recovery for personal injury 
even when the goods in question are not defective, is the fact that 
the line between the implied warranty of merchantability, on the 
one hand, and the implied warranty of fitness for particular pur-
pose and express warranty, on the other, is so blurred as to be es-
sentially indistinct. For goods to be merchantable, they must at 
least 
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the agreed description; 
(2) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair, average quality within 
the description; 
(3) be fit for ordinary purposes for which goods of that description 
are used; 
( 4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even 
kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all 
units involved; 
(5) be adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agree-
mentor circumstances may require; and 
(6) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the 
163 At the 1996 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Commissioner King Hill moved to exclude from the draft article 2 revision 
recovery for personal injury and property damage under warranty claims. Id. 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 155-59. 
165 Although five states currently do not recognize a cause of action in strict products 
liability, it is not the task of the drafters of uniform law to provide such law for these states. 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia may not want such recov-
ery for personal injury. Alternatively, these states can always make the necessary adjustments 
in a revised article 2 to meet their particular needs and policy goals. 
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container or label if any. 166 
The italicized language confirms the affinity between the implied 
warranty of merchantability and the express warranties under the 
revision. Express warranties, under the revision, arise when "a 
seller makes a representation or a promise relating to the goods" 
(1) "to an immediate buyer,"167 (2) "on or in a container, on a la-
bel, in a record, or that is otherwise packaged with or accompanies 
the goods,"168 or (3) "makes a representation or a promise relating 
to the goods in a medium for communication to the public, includ-
ing advertising."169 
It is now very difficult to imagine an implied warranty of mer-
chantability that could not also be, simultaneously, construed as an 
express warranty. So it may rarely be necessary to determine "mer-
chantability" by reference to the state products liability law because 
the express warranty law may in so many cases be used in place of 
the implied warranty of merchantability. It would simply be too 
easy to infer an express warranty from the "description" or "agree-
ment" that supports the implied warranty of merchantability, 
thereby paving the way for courts to impose liability for personal 
injuries caused by products that are not defective under the state's 
products liability law. Further, lest. there be any suggestion that 
express warranty could not devour the implied warranty of mer-
chantability completely, keep in mind that a good's "ordinary" 
purpose may also be its "particular purpose" in order to implicate 
the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose in the event 
an implied warranty of merchantability theory is unavailable.170 
It may be that the overlap among those alternative warranty 
theories is a necessary consequence of the commercial law's erring 
on the side of comprehensive warranty coverage. Indeed, the over-
lap provides a means for an injured buyer to recover against a re-
tail seller for affirmations on a label affixed by the wholesaler.171 
166 U.C.C. § 2-404 (Tentative Draft, Mar. l, 1998) (emphasis added). 
167 Id.§ 2-403(a) (Tentative Draft, Mar. l, 1998). 
168 Id.§ 2-408(b) (Tentative Draft, Mar. l, 1998). 
169 Id.§ 2-408(c) (Tentative Draft, Mar. l, 1998). 
170 This could be the case, under current law, if there was a proper disclaimer of the 
warranty of merchantability but not of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, or 
vice-versa. 
m For instance, a retailer is not automatically liable under section 2-313 for a manufac-
turer's express warranties; the retailer may be liable, however, for breach of an implied 
warranty of merchantability under section 2-314(2) (f) if a product fails to conform to a 
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And that circumstance has not done violence to the commercial 
law. But when the redundancy provides the means to impose li-
ability for the same public policy reasons that the strict products 
liability law vindicates without reference to the limitations of that 
law, particularly the limitation imposed by the "defect" require-
ment, then the warranty law may well unravel. Consequently, the 
arguments in favor of excepting personal injury from article 2 may 
become all the more compelling. 
The problell,l remains that the members of the Article 2 Drafting 
Committee have not yet made the case for accommodation of war-
ranty and strict products law that their reformulation of the sales 
law would accomplish. The Committee has failed to come to terms 
with a warranty regime that would operate without respect to priv-
ity requirements172 and which would, essentially, fuse the bases of 
manufacturer's promise on the label. See DAVID S. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., 
PRODUCTS LIABILfIY 68 n.l (1994) (notes following Scovil v. Chilcoat, 424 P.2d 87, 91 (Okla. 
1967)) (noting that retailer may adopt manufacturer's written warranty by statement of 
promises or actions). 
172 The revisions completely abrogate horizontal privity defenses by means of draft sec-
tions 2-403, 2-408, and 2-409. Draft section 2-403(c) explains how an express warranty can be 
created: "(a] seller's obligation under this section may be created by representations and 
promises made in a medium for communication to the public, including advertising, if the 
immediate buyer had knowledge of [and believed] them at the time of the agreement." 
U.C.C. § 2-403(c) (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). Draft section 2-408(b) extends an express 
warranty to a remote buyer through a seller's written representation: 
If a seller makes a representation or a promise relating to goods on or in a 
container, on a label, in a record, or that is otherwise packaged with or ac-
companies the goods ... the seller has an obligation to the remote buyer 
and its transferee ... that the goods will conform to the representation or 
that the promise will be performed, unless a reasonable person in the po-
sition of the remote buyer would not believe the representation or prom-
ise or would believe that any representation was merely of the value of the 
goods or purported to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of 
the goods. 
Id. § 2-408(b) (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). Draft section 2-408(c) extends an express 
warranty to a remote buyer through a seller's public communication: 
If a seller makes a representation or a promise relating to the goods in a 
medium for communication to the public, including advertising, and a 
remote buyer with knowledge of the representation or promise buys or 
leases the goods from a person [in the normal chain of distribution] the 
seller has an obligation to the remote buyer ... that the goods will con-
form to the representation, or that the promise will be performed. 
Id.§ 2-408(c). In both sections 2-408(b) and (c), an express warranty also is extended hori-
zontally to the family or household of a remote consumer buyer, including a guest in the 
remote buyer's home. 
Finally, Draft section 2-409(a) stipulates that implied warranties also can be extended 
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express and implied warranty liability. It may be that warranty as 
we know it, as the drafters of prestrict products liability law article 2 
knew it, does not work in the contemporary legal environment. 
The Committee, to date, has not conducted or consulted a com-
prehensive study of the fit among the complementary bases of 
seller liability for products that hurt people. That failure is enough 
to undermine the entire article 2 revision effort. 
IV. ABSENCE OF INFORMATION 
The substantive rules of article 2 are intended to serve certain 
social purposes. The most prominent among these is to facilitate 
the orderly buying and selling of goods.173 To devise rules that will 
accomplish this goal, it is essential that rule makers have a rea-
sonably accurate understanding of how the system (broadly con-
ceived) works.174 This demands accurate knowledge not only of the 
to a remote buyer: 
A seller's express or implied warranty made to an immediate buyer ex-
tends to any remote buyer or transferee, and in the case of any consumer 
buyer, to any member of the family or household of the consumer buyer, 
that may reasonably be expected to use or be affected by the goods and 
that is damaged by a breach of warranty. 
Id.§ 2-409(a) (Tentative Draft, Mar. 1, 1998). 
"' In addition to this practical end, it has been said that any commercial code should be 
designed to achieve the following objectives: certainty and uniformity, conformity to com-
mon expectations, individual autonomy, individual and group responsibility, equality 
through the reversibility of relations, and justice. See 1 N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 23, 
at 82-86. 
174 Much of the literature traces this view to the American realist school and its acknowl-
edged leader, Karl Llewellyn. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl llewellyn 
and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 493 (1987). In this article the author com-
ments on Llyewellyn: 
As his 1930 Casebook demonstrates, Llewellyn recognized early on the gap 
between the Uniform Sales Act's approach to sales and the commercial re-
alities of his day. It was not simply that the Act failed to take account of 
growing complexities but that its approach had little to do with the facts of 
the transactions it governed. 
Id. When Llewellyn took charge of the Code project and assumed responsibility for drafting 
article 2 he was provided with the perfect opportunity to apply his realist method to com-
mercial law. Not only did Llewellyn believe that an understanding of commercial practices 
was an essential criterion for effective legislative drafting, he also believed that it was an 
indispensable component of the judicial process. He, therefore, drafted article 2 with flexi-
ble standards and in such a way that also required a court to familiarize itself with relevant 
commercial practices. 
[U]tilizing flexible standards, such as commercial reasonableness and 
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underlying transactions and the behavior of the transactors, but 
also of the effects of legal procedure and of the social, economic, 
and technological environment. Surely, the behavior of buyers 
and sellers cannot be understood without understanding their ex-
ternal environment. One of the most remarkable features of the 
article 2 revision process is that drafting decisions are being made 
without supporting evidence. Instead of verifiable facts, the Article 
2 Drafting Committee is forced to rely on shared assumptions and 
guess at which drafting strategies will accomplish their objectives.175 
The result is a series of revisions that may be effectual, ineffectual 
or, perhaps, will make matters worse. There is simply no way to 
know.11s 
good faith, rather than rules that purport to capture and solidify prevail-
ing practices and norms. Each dispute between a seller and buyer is 
placed in its functional setting where the parties are expected to find and 
prove relevant "habits," i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the agree-. 
ment. Under these standards, the court is given flexibility (at some cost to 
certainty and administrability) to resolve the new or unique dispute. 
Moreover, standards are thought to reduce the gap between Jaw and prac-
tice and to insure that decisions are practical and responsive to the needs, 
proven in the particular case, of the parties and the relevant business community. 
PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL Com:, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (1990) [hereinafter PEB ARTICLE 2 
REPoRT] (clarifying·underlying policies behind article 2 drafting). At this juncture it is 
important to note that Llewellyn never believed, nor do we, that statutory Jaw ought to re-
flect commercial practices in all cases. For Llewellyn, "merchant reality included a strong 
normative component, expressed in his efforts both to impose the 'better' mercantile prac-
tice on merchants and to avoid imposing unfair obligations on consumers." Wiseman, supra, 
at 469 n.13. Thus, although Llewellyn sought to eliminate the cleft between "is" and 
"ought," it was not always a matter of the "ought" acquiescing in the "is." Sometimes he felt 
that it was necessary for the Is to conform to the Ought. However, in the words of Elizabeth 
Warren: "You can't talk about 'ought' without identifying the presumptions about what 'is.' 
And to talk about one without the other is to be nonsensical." Elizabeth Warren, Comments 
on Professor "1hites Paper, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49, 55. See generally]a.mes]. White, Promise 
Fulfilled and Principl.e Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 16-42 (discussing legal realism and 
Karl Llewellyn in context ofUCC article 2). 
"' This problem is not unique to the article 2 project. For example, Professor White, 
the Reporter for revised article 5, laments that "the debate over law is ... almost completely 
devoid of reliable empirical data." James J. White, The Impact of Internationalization of Trans-
national Commercial law: The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of Articl.e 5 of the 
U.C.C., 16 NW.J. INT'LL. & Bus. 189, 213 (1995). 
176 This conclusion should come as no surprise to anyone who thinks about the legisla-
tive process. On this point Llewellyn observed: 
The field of Law reaches both forward and back from the Substantive Law 
of school and doctrine. The sphere of interest is widening; so, too, is the 
scope of doubt. Beyond rul.es lie effects - but do they? Are some rules mere 
paper? And if effects, what effects? Hearsay, unbuttressed guess, assump-
tion or assertion unchecked by test - can such be trusted on this matter 
of what Jaw is doing? 
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It is useful to note the nature of what often has passed for evi-
dence of how the system operates. Much of what dominates dis-
cussion about article 2 and its revision consists of conclusory asser-
tions, without reliable data to sustain them. These are proffered to 
the Drafting Committee not just by the lobbyists whose job it is to 
push a particular version of commercial reality, but also by the ad-
visors and observers who regularly attend the drafting meetings 
and even by the committee members themselves. In other words, 
all participants are equally guilty. The following are several exam-
ples of this so-called "evidence." 
One advertising agency informs the Drafting Committee that 
"[n]ot only do [consumers] know puffery when they hear it, they 
can spot it a mile away. Today's consumers are infinitely more 
skeptical than any generation of consumers before them."177 An-
other agency is convinced that famous slogans such as ''You can be 
sure if its Westinghouse" are never misunderstood. It states: "Was 
any consumer ever misled into thinking any of this harmless puff-
ery was really a warranty? Of course not."178 
Other examples come from the pen of trade associations. Con-
sider the statement by the National Retail Federation that "[w]hile 
[the Statute of Frauds] may sometimes be used by those who wish 
to avoid their contractual obligations, it is more frequently used to 
cut off those who seek to invent contractual obligations where 
none exist. "179 The National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
purports to sum up the substance of commercial agreements by 
claiming: 
Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 
1222, 1222-25 (1931) (responding to Dean Pound's assertions about realism determining 
that other fields are influencing law today). This same concern was voiced by the Article 2 
Study Committee. See PEB ARTICLE 2 REPORT, supra note 174, at 7 (noting that it is "hard to 
be accurate without knowledge of relevant practices"). It has also been echoed by commen-
tators galore. See, for example, Warren, supra note 174, at 52: 
To impose statutory "solutions" means that there has to be much more in-
formation about how the system operates generally. What that means ul-
timately - and the legal realists, I think saw this from the beginning - is 
that without empirical work of some kind, you can't go forward. You can't 
make good decisions. 
177 Letter from DMB&B to Hall Dickier Kent Friedman & Wood LLP oan. 30, 1995) 
(on file with author). 
178 Letter from Lenac, Warford, Stone, Inc. to Hall Dickier Kent Friedman & Wood LLP 
(Feb. 2, 1995) (on file with author). 
179 Letter from the National Retail Federation to the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with author). 
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We maintain that the true expectations of commercial buyers and 
sellers are for contract terms substantially more favorable to sell-
ers than those provided by the Code gap fillers. Negotiated con-
tracts between commercial buyers and sellers bear this out, for 
those contracts typically restrict the buyer's recovery of conse-
quential damages, often shorten the statute of limitations, rou-
tinely disclaim implied warranties and replace them with express 
warranties, and otherwise modify the remedy provisions of Article 
2 in favor of the seller's interests. 180 
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Two final examples are taken from the unofficial minutes of one 
of the Drafting Committee's many meetings. During a discussion 
on coverage of services, the members of the Drafting Committee 
were told "that frequently the service supplier was a third party" 
d "th . fi b • ,,181 an at services contracts were o ten warranty su sntutes. 
The preceding examples should suffice to, make the point. 
While each of these "facts" is a plausible account of reality in the 
world at large, none is offered with enough evidence to convince 
us that they should serve as a valuable guide to law reform. 
A second source of information for decisions by the Drafting 
Committee is anecdotal evidence derived from the many stories 
told by those who participate at drafting meetings and the content 
of more than forty years of Code case law. While we readily admit 
that storytelling has some evidentiary value, we believe that its per-
suasive power far exceeds its worth. To be fair, we a:re not talking 
about the individual who says "I know ... " or ''I'm sure it operates 
that way because I practiced law for an hour and a half."182 Such 
persons are easily ignored. Our concern is with statements made 
in apparent good faith by experienced commercial practitioners. 
Even if we were to concede their absolute truth (which we do 
not) 183 this is not the type of data that one can comfortably rely 
upon to draw correct inferences about whatever it is that we are 
trying to understand. Hearing people talk about the cases that 
they have litigated or otherwise been involved with in their particu-
180 Letter from the National Electrical Manufacturers Association to Lawrence J. Bugge, 
Committee Chair, & Richard E. Speidel, Reporter, (Sept. 13, 1993) (on file with author). 
181 Thomas J. McCarthy, Chair of ABA, Remarks at the Meeting of Drafting Committee 
(Mar. 10-12, 1995) (on file with author). 
182 Warren, supra note 17 4, at 53. 
183 The explanation for distorted portrayals of actual cases, even where there has been 
no attempt at fabrication, is that we no doubt tend to forget certain details with the passage 
of time and our memories are, to some degree, selective. 
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lar practice tells us almost nothing about the overall frequency of 
such occurrences, their causes and effects, or how people behave 
in other industries and contexts. 
Yet what about the case law? For obvious reasons cases form the 
principal data base from which the Drafting Committee seeks its 
information about the real world; cases cost little to access and all 
Committee members have been trained to read and understand 
them. On reflection, however, relying on cases is to say, "like the 
drunk looking under the lamppost, 'Hey, [we] have to look where 
the information is.' [We] don't have the time, the energy, the 
money and for many people, one would add, in a lot of contexts 
the skills, to go out there and look at life itself."184 Cases simply do 
not provide the information needed to assess the system. 
One difficulty with relying on cases is that they only tell stories of 
deals gone bad. However, the overwhelming bulk of transactions 
do not break down, and of those that do, most are presumably set-
tled without litigation. In those situations where a lawsuit does 
result or the parties invoke some other formal dispute resolution 
mechanism, only a small percentage of cases will lead to a pub-
lished opinion. What we find, therefore, scattered throughout the 
volumes of the various reporter systems is, at best, a very small and 
aberrational subset of commercial activity. 
Another reason for discounting the empirical value of cases is 
that they are by necessity always backward looking. The cases tell 
us about yesterday's transactions. What cannot be seen, but can 
only be guessed at, is the impact of the Code on what people do. 
For example, Professor James White posits that the original Code 
drafters botched section 2-207 because "they grossly overestimated 
their knowledge of the underlying transactions."185 To make his 
point, White counts twenty-seven "hard" cases in six of the then 
most recent volumes of the UCC Reporting Service. 186 Taken 
together, all of these cases might suggest that at the outset the 
drafters misconceived contracting practices. However, it may be 
that this original disjunction of law and practice has been 
sufficiently eroded by the passage of time so that section 2-207 is no 
longer a statutory problem in need of a fix. This may explain why 
184 See Richard Danzig, Comments on Professor White's Paper, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 56, 57 
(1998) (discussing Professor White's focus on realism and concluding that realists fail to 
analyze how law impacts life). 
185 White, supra note 174, at 33. 
186 See40-42 U.C.C. Rep. Seiv. (CBC); 1-3 U.C.C. Rep. Seiv. 2d (CBC). 
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there are only two cases in a later, randomly selected, volume of 
the same reporting service.187 Moreover, we have heard it said, time 
and time again at drafting meetings, that the commercial 
community has learned to play the "battle of the forms" game. 
This illustrates that it is not enough to look only at the number of 
cases.
188 Unless we pay attention to the timing of the cases and look 
at the way practices have evolved over time, we are unlikely to get 
the data that we need to make the right legislative choices. 
The Drafting Committee's recent decision to retain and revise 
· the Statute of Frauds is perhaps the clearest example of a determi-
nation made without an empirically validated model of behavior to 
support it. 189 And that is too bad, because much of the rhetoric 
surrounding the Statute has always hinged on untested factual as-
sertions. Specifically, 
[c]ommentators have criticized the statute on the grounds that it 
does not reflect actual practices in the business community and 
serves as an instrument rather than a preventative of fraud, since 
it is invoked only to enable a party to renege on an oral business 
deal which he was reasonably expected to honor. It is further ar-
187 See 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC). 
188 Indeed, even the total absence of cases on a particular issue does not necessarily 
mean that the status quo should be maintained. The rule in question still must be evaluated 
in terms of its overall effect. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 184, at 59. 
Id. 
The law is ... simply an anvil. On that anvil the individual parties are go-
ing to hammer out results. The anvil is fascinating. We can spend hours 
analyzing how it should be constructed and how varying the angle in one 
degree or another - varying the surface or the character of materials -
should be good or bad. But in the end, the process of hammering out is 
crucial, and about that process we know terribly little .... I think it is a 
crucial area. One then asks about the anvil, how does it affect the disposi-
tion of real cases in an everyday way? How does it affect the settlement 
process, etc.? 
189 The decision to delete the Statute of Frauds was one of the Committee's first drafting 
decisions. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (Discussion Draft, Dec. 21, 1993). 
Id. 
This result was strongly recommended by the PEB Study Group and was 
approved by the Drafting Committee on March 6, 1993. A motion to re-
store the statute of frauds was rejected by a voice vote of the Commission-
ers at the 1995 and 1996 Annuals [sic] Meeting ofNCCUSL. · 
However, at the November, 1996 meeting, the Drafting Committee de-
cided to restore "some version" of the statute of frauds. 
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gued that the Statute's conclusive presumption of invalidity serves 
no useful purpose, since modern fact-finding techniques will al-
low the triers of fact to ascertain accurately the existence or ab-
sence of an agreement. On the other hand the Statute is not 
without defenders. They assert that it represents contemporary 
business practice, which is partly a normative effect of the Statute; 
that the observance of written formalities is a healthy procedure 
tending to eliminate uncertainty in business transactions; and 
that the Statute encourages such procedure by rewarding busi-
nessmen who insist upon adherence to the formalities. 190 
Yet, the only empirical study regarding relevant business prac-
tices of which we are aware was published more than forty years 
ago in the Yale Law joumal. 191 I~ makes a difference if for every an-
ecdote in which a fabricated contract is claimed, one, ten, one 
hundred, or one thousand deserving plaintiffs are barred from 
relief because of their inability to satisfy the Statute's mandate. 
Notwithstanding the absence of reliable up-to-date information, 
the Drafting Committee not only reversed its previous decision and 
decided to include a Statute of Frauds within the new article 2, but 
it went ahead and substantially rewrote its text.192 To move from a 
decision to retain the Statute to a decision to alter radically its sub-
stance is quite a leap. But leap the Committee did, oblivious to the 
resulting implications.193 
190 Comment, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A RFrAppraisal in Light of 
Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE LJ. 1038, 1038-39 (1957) (discussing Statute of Frauds' place in 
contemporary business practices). 
191 See id. The study disclosed that "the promises of businessmen usually satisfy the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds." Id. at 1042 (studying manufacturer's compliance with 
Statute of Frauds in dealings with customers suppliers). However, "oral promises are more 
prevalent in the transactions of small manufacturers than in the dealings of large ones." Id. 
at 1051. 
192 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (c)(2) (Tentative Draft, Mar. l, 1998). As the notes to the draft 
section explain, "[s]ubsection (c)(2) expands the 'part performance' exception in section 2-
201 (3) (C). Conduct by both parties, including part performance, takes the case out of the 
statute and proof of agreed quantity is not limited to the quantity represented by part per-
formance." Id. 
19
' The decision by the drafters to weaken considerably the Statute is particularly surpris-
ing because the reversal in position was prompted, in large measure, by the business com-
munity's negative response to the drafters' original decision to drop the Statute. See Letter 
from Caterpillar Inc. to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, NCCUSL page (Dec. 14, 1994) 
(on file with author). Now, no one is very happy. The drafters cannot be particularly 
pleased because they wanted the Statute gone and, in its present form, business is still dissat-
isfied. See, e.g., Letter from the American Automotive Leasing Association to Reporters 
Richard E. Speidel & Linda Rusch (May 14, 1997) (on file with author). 
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Without taking issue with the specific provisions of revised sec-
tion 2-201 or, for that matter, any of the other proposed changes to 
article 2, we believe that the general approach of the drafting pro-
cess is wrong: wrong because it is not grounded in circumstances of 
which the drafters are aware. We recognize as much as anyone that 
empirical data can be expensive, time consuming, and difficult to 
produce. But to proceed without a clear understanding of the sys-
tem and its environment is foolhardy. In our view it is better to 
leave well enough alone than it is to draft a statute that may be de-
ficient in many important respects. 
CONCLUSION 
In The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, Karl Llewellyn 
compared judicial methods of decision making to those of surgery. 
First, he noted, comes "the effort to diagnose the significant prob-
lem involved, and ... the effort to mark out the life-situation which 
gives·rise to the problem."194 Only if the problem is rightly diag-
nosed, can the judge "determine ... the most appropriate line of 
treatment and [make] the specific prescription which may be 
called for." 195 We suggest that both "diagnosis" and "prescription" 
are also key components of the legislative method. 
In our view, the Article 2 Revision Committee fails here. Apart 
from the difficulties in understanding what constitutes successful 
legislative performance, it seems clear that the current article 2 
revision is flawed as a consequence of fundamental deficiencies in 
the process. The primary reason for our pessimistic assessment of 
the efficacy of this particular legislative revision effort is that the 
Committee's sensitivity to overall context (both legal and behav-
ioral) is attenuated at best and is largely limited to generalized 
statements qf law and commercial behavior offered by those who 
regularly attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee. Indeed, 
our experience indicates that credible evidence of trade practices 
is frequently a less salient determinant of diagnosis and prescrip-
tion than such nonsubstantive factors as the desire to achieve a 
superficially appealing revision package. Consider, for example, 
the question of whether consumers warrant greater protection in 
194 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 450 (1960) 
(stating that clarity is important in establishing new rule oflaw). 
195 Id. Llewellyn believed that "rightly diagnosed types of problem-situation[s] [are] the 
key to good law and good judging." Id. at 324. 
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the UCC than has traditionally been the case. Although the argu-
ment for a more consumer friendly statute is fairly straightforward, 
determination of the extent to which article 2, or any other Code 
article, should be consumer friendly is less certain. Without more 
elaborate or precise information supporting consumer concerns, 
persuasive argument regarding the appropriate degree of legisla-
tive protection is impossible. 
In sum, if the Committee's efforts are to achieve long term suc-
cess, it must be afforded more guidance than it currently receives. 
We do not mean to suggest that open discussion at Committee 
meetings be avoided and replaced by research alone. We do, how-
ever, emphasize the necessity for systematically evaluating propos-
als before changes are made. In order to maximize options for 
change and vigorously assess revisions, more information about the 
commercial law system is needed. Only if the Drafting Committee 
pays careful attention to "the health of the whole"196 will overall 
equilibrium be maintained. 
196 See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL & KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CHEYENNE WAY 332 (1941) 
(reconciling law justice problems in various cultures). 
